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HEADS I WIN, TAILS YOU LOSE:
RECONCILING BROWN V. GARDNER’S
PRESUMPTION THAT INTERPRETIVE DOUBT
BE RESOLVED IN VETERANS’ FAVOR WITH
CHEVRON
LINDA D. JELLUM*
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the United
States Supreme Court held that agencies should determine the meaning of
ambiguous statutes. But in the veterans law case Brown v. Gardner, the Supreme
Court directed lower courts to resolve interpretive doubt in ambiguous statutes in
favor of veterans. Which interpretation controls when a statute is ambiguous—the
agency’s reasonable interpretation or the veteran’s interpretation? To date, none
of the courts faced with this conflict have resolved this question clearly or
definitively; indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
recently asked the Supreme Court for guidance. To date, none has been
forthcoming.
In this article, I solve the conflict between Chevron’s deference and Gardner’s
veteran-friendly presumption. First, Gardner’s Presumption should revert to a
liberal construction canon that requires courts to construe veterans’ statutes
liberally to further their remedial purposes, rather than in the veteran-litigant’s
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organizers of the conference, Judge Davis and Judge Hagel, and especially Professor
Michael Allen, for inviting me to speak and for reviewing drafts of this paper. I also
appreciate the comments and suggestions of Professors Jack Beerman, William Funk,
Richard Murphy, and the faculty of Florida State University College of Law who attended
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Law for research and technological assistance. Finally, I would like to thank my research
assistants, Troy Clark (J.D., 2010) and Nick Phillips (J.D. Candidate, 2012) for their
outstanding and tireless help with the research for and editing of this paper. Any remaining
errors are mine alone.
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favor. The Presumption was originally a liberal construction canon before
morphing into its present super-strong formulation. Second, courts should apply
Gardner’s Presumption in limited situations. Specifically, courts should apply
Gardner’s Presumption only when the statute at issue addresses veterans’ benefits
and only when the VA has not already interpreted the statute in a way that entitles
it to Chevron deference. Third, alternatively and most promisingly, Gardner’s
Presumption could be viewed as a duty belonging to the VA rather than as an
interpretive canon that courts apply. Regardless of which solution prevails, it is
time to settle this conflict.
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INTRODUCTION
In its landmark decision, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.,1 the United States Supreme Court altered the
balance of interpretive power. Prior to Chevron, courts determined the
meaning of ambiguous regulatory statutes; after Chevron, agencies
determined the meaning of ambiguous regulatory statutes. While the effect
of Chevron is much more nuanced than this simple truism, for the purposes
of this Article, the statement is sufficient.
Yet, this truism does not hold true within veterans law. Within veterans
law, there is a third player who has an interpretive role: the veteran. The
veteran plays an interpretive role because of an unusual presumption
identified by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Gardner.2 Stated simply,
Gardner’s Presumption3 directs courts to resolve interpretive doubt in favor
of the veteran.4 Gardner’s Presumption has become a legend in veterans’
jurisprudence, as veteran-litigants5 and their counsel raise it often.6
Additionally, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
(“Veterans Court”) and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit cite the Presumption frequently.7 Even the Supreme Court
occasionally refers to it.8 Yet, Gardner’s Presumption conflicts directly
with Chevron.9
In Chevron, the Supreme Court directed courts to defer to reasonable
agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes pursuant to a two-step

1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Although many commentators insert commas in the official
cite, there are no commas in the petitioner’s name in the official U.S. Reports. Thomas W.
Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in STRAUSS’
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 399 n.1 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006).
2. 513 U.S. 115 (1994).
3. This is my term, not the courts’ term.
4. Gardner, 513 U.S. at 118.
5. While I use the terms “veteran” and “veteran-litigant” when speaking of someone
seeking benefits from the Veterans Administration, the terms are meant to include veterans
and their beneficiaries, who are also entitled to some benefits.
6. See Haas v. Peake, 544 F.3d 1306, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (raising
Gardner’s Presumption for the first time in a petition for rehearing); Sursely v. Peake, 22
Vet. App. 21, 23 (2007), rev’d, 551 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Smith v. Nicholson, 19 Vet.
App. 63, 69 (2005), rev’d, 451 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Debeaord v. Principi, 18 Vet.
App. 357, 362 (2004); Theiss v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 204, 206 (2004); Jones v. Principi,
16 Vet. App. 219, 222–23 (2002) (noting for the first time that the issue was raised in a
veteran’s brief); cf. Osman v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 252, 254 (2008) (raising the precursor to
Gardner’s Presumption in an amicus brief).
7. See, e.g., Nielson v. Shinseki, 607 F.3d 802, 808 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Carpenter v.
Principi, 15 Vet. App. 64, 76 (2001).
8. See, e.g., Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1206 (2011) (recognizing that the
Court has “long applied [the canon]”).
9. Compare Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 117–18 (1994) (stating that “interpretive
doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor”) with Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (stating that a court cannot substitute its
reading of a statute when an agency has reasonably interpreted the statute).
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analysis.10 Under Chevron’s first step, a court should determine “whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”11 If
Congress has not so spoken, then, pursuant to Chevron’s second step, a
court must accept any “permissible” or “reasonable” agency
interpretation.12 In contrast, Gardner’s Presumption directs that any
statutory interpretive doubt—which the Veterans Court has equated with
ambiguity—be resolved in a veteran’s favor.13 Therein lies the conflict:
which interpretation controls when a statute is ambiguous, the agency’s
reasonable interpretation or the veteran’s interpretation? To date, none of
the courts faced with this conflict have resolved this question even though
the Veterans Court recently called for the Supreme Court’s guidance.14
In this Article, I answer that plea by exploring and resolving the conflict
between Chevron and Gardner’s Presumption. In Part I of this Article, I
briefly describe the history of the Veterans Court, the nonadversarial nature
of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ (“VA”) administrative process, and
the unique features of veterans law that explain why this Presumption
developed and then morphed.15 In Part II, I identify how Gardner’s
Presumption started as a liberal construction canon and transformed into
the veterans’ trump card that it is today.16 In Part III, I examine the role
that Gardner’s Presumption has played in the Veterans Court, the Federal
Circuit, and the Supreme Court.17 Next, in Part IV, I explain the conflict
between Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron and trace how the Veterans
Court and the Federal Circuit have unsuccessfully attempted to resolve that
conflict.18 Finally, in Part V, I offer a number of ways to resolve the
conflict.19
While this discussion is critically relevant to those involved in veterans
law, it is also relevant to anyone applying Chevron and remedial-based
statutory interpretation canons, such as the rule of lenity or the derogation
canon. While Chevron directs that deference is owed to any reasonable
10. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
11. Id. at 843.
12. Id. at 843–44.
13. Gardner, 513 U.S. at 117–18. There was a similar presumption in tax jurisprudence
that holds tax laws “are to be interpreted liberally in favor of the taxpayers.” Bowers v.
New York & Albany Lighterage Co., 273 U.S. 346, 350 (1927). The presumption has
morphed with time. See Steve R. Johnson, Should Ambiguous Revenue Laws Be Interpreted
in Favor of Taxpayers?, NEVADA LAWYER, April 2002, at 15 (exploring how the taxpayer
presumption has changed due to broad social change).
14. Debeaord v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 357, 368 (2004).
15. See infra Part I.
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III. To do so, I have read and evaluated every case from the Veterans
Court, Federal Circuit, and Supreme Court through April 2011 in which Gardner’s
Presumption was mentioned.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part V.
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agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute, remedial canons direct that
broad interpretations should control when statutes are ambiguous. How
should that conflict be resolved? This article answers that question in the
context of veterans law.
I.

VETERANS LAW: A NONADVERSARIAL SYSTEM

Understanding why Gardner’s Presumption developed and became so
legendary within veterans law requires an understanding of the
development of the Veterans Court.20 Judicial review of VA decisions is
relatively recent. Prior to 1988, VA benefit decisions were nonreviewable.21 The VA acted in “splendid isolation.”22 Congress precluded
review of such decisions, in part, due to the financial pressures of the Great
Depression; essentially, Congress opted to save the government money and
resources by denying review.23 Not surprisingly, veterans disliked this
system and fought for change.24 In 1988, Congress created the Veterans
Court, an Article I court, to provide judicial oversight of VA benefit
decisions and to guarantee that those who risked their lives to defend
America would have their day in court.25 For the first time in history,
veterans could seek review of adverse VA decisions.
The Veterans Court is unique. It has nine judges, whom the President
appoints with the advice and consent of the Senate.26 It is an appellate
20. See generally, James D. Ridgway, The Veterans’ Judicial Review Act Twenty Years
Later: Confronting the New Complexities of the Veterans Benefits System, 66 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 251 (2010) (explaining how the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act moved the VA
system from a charitable model to one of entitlement).
21. Act of March 20, 1933, ch. 3, § 5, 48 Stat. 9 (1933) (“All decisions rendered by the
Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs . . . shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law
and fact, and no other official or court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to review .
. . .”).
22. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122 (1994) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-963, pt. 1,
at 10 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). For detail regarding the development of
the VA system and judicial review, see James D. Ridgway, The Splendid Isolation
Revisited: Lessons from the History of Veterans’ Benefits Before Judicial Review, 3 VET. L.
REV. 135 (2011); see also Ihor Gawdiak et al., Fed. Research Div., Library of Cong.,
VETERANS BENEFITS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN SYSTEM (Mar. 1992).
23. See Scott H. Reisch, 211 In Progress: Must the Veterans’ Administration Comply
with Federal Law?, 40 STAN. L. REV. 323, 323 & n.4 (1987). While most VA benefit
decisions were non-reviewable, there were some exceptions. See Johnson v. Robison, 415
U.S. 361, 367 (1974) (holding appellees could challenge the constitutionality of VA
decisions); Barton F. Stichman, The Impact of the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act on the
Federal Circuit, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 855, 856–57 (1992) (noting that courts could hear
challenges that VA regulations were arbitrary and capricious or violated statutory authority).
24. See Laurence R. Helfer, The Politics of Judicial Structure: Creating the United
States Court of Veterans Appeals, 25 CONN. L. REV. 155, 162–65 (1992) (discussing
veterans’ dissatisfaction with the VA adjudication process prior to 1988).
25. Id.
26. Originally, only seven judges were to be appointed for fifteen-year terms. 38
U.S.C. § 7253(a), (c). Congress later added two positions on a temporary basis. 38 U.S.C.
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court and, thus, it lacks authority to make factual determinations, except as
to jurisdiction and prejudicial error.27 Interestingly, the court can act either
by three-judge panels or by a single judge.28 The single-judge decisionmaking authority is unique to the Veterans Court and, while somewhat
controversial, it may be a necessity.29 The court has a crushing caseload:
for example, in 2009, veterans filed 4,725 new cases with the court, which
rendered 4,379 decisions.30
The veterans law system is distinctive in two important ways. First, “the
VA [administrative] process is a nonadversarial one.”31
Congress
specifically included a number of statutory advantages to veterans to ensure
the nonadversarial and pro-claimant character of the administrative
process.32 For example, the VA must notify claimants of what they must
do to establish an entitlement to benefits.33 This notice must include “any
information, and any medical or lay evidence, not previously provided to
the Secretary that is necessary to substantiate the claim.”34 Additionally,
§ 7251(h).
27. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(c).
28. 38 U.S.C. § 7254(b).
29. See, e.g., Sarah M. Haley, Note, Single-Judge Adjudication in the Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims and the Devaluation of Stare Decisis, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 535 (2004)
(discussing critics’ simultaneous praise and condemnation of the court); Ronald L. Smith,
The Administration of Single Judge Decisional Authority by the United States Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims, 13 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 279 (2004) (noting the
overwhelming number of appeals heard by the court).
30. Michael P. Allen, Due Process and the American Veteran: What the Constitution
Can Tell Us About the Veterans’ Benefits System, 80 U. Cinn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011)
(citing Annual Reports, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS, available at
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/Annual_Report_FY_2009_October_1
_2008_to_September_30_2009.pdf [hereinafter VETERANS COURT ANNUAL REPORTS]).
31. Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 69, 75 (1995); see Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S.
Ct. 1197, 1200 (2011) (recognizing that the VA’s process for adjudicating a claim is non
adversarial); accord Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 323, 333–
34 (1985) (stating that the system is designed to be “as informal and nonadversarial as
possible”); Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (concluding that because
the system is “so uniquely pro-claimant,” fairness is of great importance); Collaro v. West,
136 F.3d 1304, 1309–10 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (recognizing that the system is “nonadversarial, ex
parte, [and] paternalistic”).
32. See Allen, Due Process and the American Veteran, supra note 30 (noting that when
a veteran receives a satisfactory decision from the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, the process
ends, but that a veteran who remains unsatisfied has an opportunity to appeal); Michael P.
Allen, The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims at Twenty: A Proposal for a
Legislative Commission to Consider its Future, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 365–72 (2009)
(same); Michael P. Allen, Significant Developments in Veterans Law (2004–2006) and
What They Reveal About the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 483, 488 (2007) (explaining
that Congress, in instituting the Veterans Court, provided for the first time “a meaningful
and predictably available independent review of VA benefits decisions”).
33. 38 U.S.C. § 5102(a).
34. Id. § 5103(a); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1) (adopting regulations implementing
the statutory duty to assist). Note the unusual nature of this obligation was recognized by
one member of the Supreme Court. Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 1709 (2009)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“The VA differs from virtually every other agency in being itself
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the VA Secretary cannot appeal a decision from the VA that favors the
veteran.35 However, once a veteran files a notice of appeal with the
Veterans Court, the nonadversarial nature of the proceedings disappears.36
Second, the veterans law system is distinctive in that the proportion of
litigants filing a notice of appeal pro se is the highest of any federal
appellate court in the country, averaging roughly seventy to eighty
percent.37 This high pro se rate developed, in part, because of the
disincentives for lawyers to participate. For example, until 1988, lawyers
could earn no more than ten dollars for assisting veterans with their
claims.38 Given that the veterans’ system is nonadversarial, pro-claimant,
and pro se, it might be expected that a presumption favoring veteranfriendly interpretations of ambiguous statutes would arise.
II. THE CREATION OF GARDNER’S PRESUMPTION
In a system that respects and values veterans to such a high degree, it
should come as no surprise that Gardner’s Presumption, which directs
courts to interpret ambiguous statutes in favor of veterans, would develop.
However, Gardner’s Presumption began life in a less veteran-friendly
form.
This next section explores the development of Gardner’s
Presumption from its humble beginnings as a liberal construction canon to
its current formulation as a tie-breaking trump card.

obligated to help the claimant develop his claim . . . .”); see also Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of
Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 323, 333–34 (1985) (indicating that veterans are given
safeguards including adequate representation, a duty on the part of the adjudicator to help
the veteran, and “significant concessions with respect to the claimant’s burden of proof”).
35. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a). However, any aggrieved party may appeal a Veterans Court
decision to the Federal Circuit. 38 U.S.C. § 7292. The Federal Circuit has the power to
review legal questions only; it cannot rule on factual determination or on the application of
law to the facts in a particular case. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).
36. The Veterans Court advises litigants that “[t]he Court’s review of an appeal is an
adversarial process and pro-veteran rules under which the VA decides claims do not apply
to the Court.” United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, Court Process,
available at http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/about/how_to_appeal/
HowtoAppealWithoutCourtProcess.cfm.
37. Bazalo v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 304, 312 (1996) (Steinberg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), rev’d sub nom. Bazalo v. West, 150 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating
“about eighty percent”); VETERANS COURT ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 30 (stating sixtyeight percent for 2009).
38. Act of July 4, 1864, §§ 12-13, 13 Stat. 387, 389. Before that, fees were limited to
$5. Act of July 14, 1862, §§ 6-7, 12 Stat. 566, 568. See Walters, 468 U.S. at 1323
(addressing the $10 fee limit); Allen, Due Process and the American Veteran, supra note 30
(describing the fee limitation). Although most individuals filing notices of appeal at the
Veterans Court are self-represented at the time of filing, they are not necessarily selfrepresented at the VA. The VA recognizes many service organizations that provide
assistance to veterans pursuing a claim. The recognized service organizations can be found
on the VA website: http://www.va.gov/vso/.
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A. Gardner’s Precursor: Boone’s Interpretive Canon
Gardner’s Presumption (or rather its precursor) made its first official
appearance in 1943, in Boone v. Lightner.39 In Boone, a serviceman in the
military was sued to, among other things, “require him to account as trustee
of a fund for his minor daughter.”40 Prior to the trial, the serviceman
requested a continuance under the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act
until after he completed his tour of duty.41 The trial judge denied the
request.42 The serviceman lost the trial, and the court ordered him to pay
$11,000.43 Importantly, there was no agency interpretation at issue in this
case44—just two private parties disputing the meaning of a statute.45
The serviceman appealed, arguing that the trial court should have
granted his request for a continuance.46 The Supreme Court disagreed,
holding that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that his
military service did not prevent him from being able to attend the trial and
prepare a defense to the suit.47 However, at the conclusion of the Court’s
analysis, the Court noted, without citing any authority and without
explaining the import of its statement, that “[t]he Soldiers’ and Sailors’
Civil Relief Act is always to be liberally construed to protect those who
have been obliged to drop their own affairs to take up the burdens of the
nation.”48 The Court thereby created, or at least articulated for the first
time, the interpretive canon that statutes benefitting military personnel
should be liberally construed. This interpretive canon would become the
foundation for Gardner’s Presumption—which directs that veterans
statutes should be construed not just liberally, but in the veteran’s favor.49
A few years after Boone, the Supreme Court again referenced, without
further explanation, Boone’s interpretive canon in Fishgold v. Sullivan
39. 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943).
40. Id. at 561–62. He was trustee of a trust fund. Id. at 562.
41. Id. at 563.
42. Id. at 564.
43. Id.
44. Therefore, Chevron would not have applied even had it existed.
45. Boone, 319 U.S. at 564–65. The Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act provided:
At any stage thereof any action or proceeding in any court in which a person in
military service is involved, either as plaintiff or defendant, during the period of
such service . . . may, in the discretion of the court in which it is pending . . . be
stayed as provided in this Act, unless, in the opinion of the court, the ability of
plaintiff to prosecute the action or the defendant to conduct his defense is not
materially affected by reason of his military service.
Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940, ch. 888, art. II, § 201, 54 Stat. 1178, 1181
(1940).
46. Boone, 319 U.S. at 564.
47. Id. at 572.
48. Id. at 575. Or, as Justice Douglas noted in a later case, “the Act must be read with
an eye friendly to those who dropped their affairs to answer their country’s call.” Le
Maistre v. Leffers, 333 U.S. 1, 6 (1948).
49. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 117–18 (1994).
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Drydock & Repair Corp.50 In Fishgold, the Court had to determine
whether a veteran who returned to his former job as a welder could be laid
off during slow work periods or whether such a layoff would violate the
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.51 As in Boone, there was no
agency interpretation at issue in this case, but rather two private parties
disputing the meaning of a statute.52 The Supreme Court adopted the
employer’s interpretation, allowing the employer to lay off the employee
due to slowed working conditions.53 In its analysis, the Court stated
simply, “[t]his legislation is to be liberally construed for the benefit of
those who left private life to serve their country in its hour of great need.”54
The Court cited Boone but failed to elaborate or explain the interpretive
canon.55 Also, as it had in Boone, the Court did not interpret the statute in
the veteran’s favor despite the direction to construe such statutes liberally.56
Those familiar with statutory interpretation have likely already noted the
similarity of Boone’s interpretive canon with an oft-repeated canon of
interpretation that instructs that remedial statutes should be construed
liberally to further their “remedial” purposes.57 Boone’s interpretive canon
is similar, if not identical, to the remedial interpretation canon, likely
because veterans’ benefits statutes are remedial.58 Remedial statutes
50. 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946).
51. Id. at 280.
52. Id. at 279–80 (describing private parties’ involvement in the dispute). The statute at
issue provided:
In the case of any [military personnel] who, in order to perform such training and
service, has left or leaves a position, other than a temporary position, in the employ
of any employer . . . such employer shall restore such person to such position or to
a position of like seniority, status, and pay unless the employer’s circumstances
have so changed as to make it impossible or unreasonable to do so . . . .
Id. at 278 n.1 (quoting Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 885, 50 U.S.C.
Appendix, § 301 et seq.).
53. Fishgold, 328 U.S. at 288.
54. Id. at 285 (citing Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943)).
55. See id. at 285 (asserting that legislation addressing honorable discharge of veterans
is to be liberally construed in favor of veterans without addressing the foundation for this
assertion).
56. See id. at 288 (finding no support for the petitioner’s assertion that he should be
restored to his former position).
57. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403–04 (1991); Smith v. Brown, 35 F.3d 1516,
1525 (Fed. Cir. 1994), superseded by statute, 38 U.S.C. § 7111 (1997), as recognized in
Samish Indian Nation v. United States, 419 F.3d 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2005). For example, in
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995), the
majority construed the word “take” broadly because the majority characterized the statute at
issue to be “remedial.” Id. at 704–08. In contrast, writing for the dissent, Justice Scalia
refused to interpret the word broadly because the statute impacted property rights and was,
therefore, in derogation of common law. Id. at 717–18 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Ne.
Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 268 (1977) (reasoning that the broad
language of the remedial statute indicates that the Court should take an expansive view of its
coverage; Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953) (announcing that the statute should be
liberally interpreted to achieve its intent and avoid unfair results).
58. See Smith, 35 F.3d at 1525–26 (stating that veterans’ benefits statutes “clearly fall”
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correct (or remedy) existing statutes, create new rights, or expand remedies
that were otherwise unavailable at common law.59 Hence, the Court’s
development of and lack of explanation for Boone’s interpretive canon is,
perhaps, unsurprising. Yet, in neither Boone nor Fishgold did the Court
mention the remedial canon as its basis for creating Boone’s interpretive
canon. It is therefore unclear whether the Court believed that liberal
interpretation was appropriate simply because veterans’ benefits statutes
are remedial in nature or for some other, unstated reason. In later cases, the
Court identified two reasons for liberally construing veterans’ benefits
statutes: first, to express the nation’s gratitude for veterans’ sacrifice; and
second, to help veterans overcome the adverse effects of service and
reenter society more readily.60 Thus, liberally construing veterans’ benefits
statutes furthers important policies—expressing gratitude and helping
veterans. Moreover, interpreting veterans’ benefits statutes liberally to
achieve these purposes seems appropriate and consistent with the remedial
canon and the veteran-friendly nature of veterans law.
B. Boone’s Morph
While Boone’s interpretive canon simply directed courts to construe
veterans’ benefits statutes liberally, the Court transformed it from a liberal
construction canon to a trump card that veterans could assert to defeat
reasonable agency interpretations. This section will explain how this
transformation occurred.
The Supreme Court began its transformation of Boone’s interpretive
canon in King v. Saint Vincent’s Hospital.61 In that case, the Court had to
determine whether a provision in the Veterans Reemployment Rights Act
provided a member of the reserve services with an unlimited right to

in the remedial category); White v. Unites States, 102 F. Supp. 585, 586 (Ct. Cl. 1952)
(citing Fishgold, 328 U.S. at 275; Boone, 319 U.S. at 561) (“As remedial legislation [the
veterans statutes at issue] are to be liberally construed.”).
59. LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 251 (2008). But see
Ober United Travel Agency, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 135 F.3d 822, 825 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (stating “it is not at all apparent just what is and what is not remedial legislation;
indeed all legislation might be thought remedial in some sense—even massive
codifications.”).
60. Hooper v. Bernalillo Cnty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 626 & n.3 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). In Hooper, Justice Stevens noted that “[the] simple interest [of] expressing . . .
gratitude” for sacrifices veterans have made is “adequate justification” and further, “the fact
that military service typically disrupts the normal progress of civilian employment justifies
additional tangible benefits . . . to facilitate the reentry into civilian society. A policy of
providing special benefits for veterans’ past contributions has ‘always been deemed to be
legitimate.’” Id. (quoting Boone, 319 U.S. at 575); see also Regan v. Taxation With
Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550–52 (1983) (“Our country has a longstanding
policy of compensating veterans for their past contributions by providing them with
numerous advantages.”).
61. 502 U.S. 215 (1991).
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civilian reemployment.62 The reservist’s employer refused the reservist’s
request for a three-year leave of absence, claiming the length of time was
unreasonable.63 As was true in Boone and Fishgold, this lawsuit did not
involve an agency’s interpretation of a statute.64 Rather, the reservist’s
employer sought a declaratory judgment that the statute should be read to
include a reasonable limit on the length of time that the reservist’s position
had to be kept open.65 Hence, here again two private parties disputed a
statute’s meaning.66 Rejecting the employer’s interpretation,67 the Supreme
Court found the text of the statute clear and free of any express limitation.68
The Court could and should have ended its analysis there; it did not.
Instead, in a footnote, the Court suggested in dictum that even if the
employer had had a reasonable argument that the statute was ambiguous,
the Court would have resolved any ambiguity in favor of the reservist.69
The Court cited Fishgold for support for its assertion and noted that
Congress was likely aware of this interpretive principle when it drafted the
statute.70 But Fishgold did not support the Court’s assertion. In Fishgold
(and Boone), the Court said only that veterans’ benefits statutes should be
liberally construed to further the dual purposes of expressing gratitude and
of helping veterans assimilate back into civilian life.71
In contrast, in King, the Court changed Boone’s interpretive canon from
a liberal construction canon into a command that courts construe such
62. Id. at 216.
63. Id. at 217.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 219.
66. The Act provided:
[Any covered person] shall upon request be granted a leave of absence by such
person’s employer for the period required to perform active duty for training or
inactive duty training in the Armed Forces of the United States. Upon such
employee’s release from a period of such . . . [duty] . . . such employee shall be
permitted to return to such employee’s position with such seniority, status, pay, and
vacation as such employee would have had if such employee had not been absent
for such purposes.
Id. at 218 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 2024(d)(1988)).
67. The employer argued that the language in the statute—for the period required to
perform active duty for training or inactive duty training—should be read to include a
reasonableness limitation to protect employers generally from the burdens of holding jobs
open indefinitely. Id. at 218. Lower courts agreed. The United States Court of Appeals for
the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits had engrafted a reasonableness requirement, while
the Fourth Circuit declined to do so. Id.
68. Id. at 222. While the Court recognized the employer’s concerns, it did not feel
comfortable “tinker[ing] with the statutory scheme [by] accord[ing] some significance to the
burdens imposed on both employers and workers when long leaves of absence are the
chosen means of guaranteeing eventual reemployment to military personnel.” Id. at 220.
69. Id. at 220–21 n.9 (“[The Court] would ultimately read the provision in [the
reservist’s] favor under the canon that provisions for benefits to members of the Armed
Services are to be construed in the beneficiaries’ favor.”).
70. Id.
71. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 288 (1946); Boone v.
Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943).
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statutes “in the [veterans’] favor.”72 Construing a statute liberally and
construing a statute in a veteran’s favor are not identical; a statute can be
liberally construed and still not favor the veteran, as the outcomes in both
Boone and Fishgold demonstrated.73 Boone’s morph into a super-strong
presumption thus started as dictum in this footnote from King.
Had the Court simply created and then transformed Boone’s interpretive
canon and stopped, applying it only to cases involving private litigants,
there would be little to discuss in this Article. Yet, with time, the Court
expanded the application of this interpretive canon from those cases
involving private litigants arguing over how to interpret a statute to all
cases involving veterans and questions of statutory interpretation.74 Up and
until the time King was decided, Boone’s interpretive canon had been
applied only in cases involving individual litigants arguing about the
interpretation of a statute.75 No agency interpretations were involved
because VA benefit decisions were not yet reviewable.76 Thus, from the
time the Supreme Court created Boone’s interpretive canon in 1943 until
the time that Congress created the Veterans Court in 1988, no court applied
the canon in a case in which a veteran and the VA disputed the
interpretation of a statute. With the arrival of Chevron deference in 1984
and the creation of judicial review of VA decisions in 1988, the landscape
changed.
C. Chevron Deference
In Chevron, the Supreme Court developed its famous, two-step
framework for courts to use when evaluating an agency’s interpretation of a
statute.77 The facts of the case are well-known and need not be repeated
here.78 The issue for the Court was whether the Environmental Protection
72. King, 502 U.S. at 221 n.9.
73. Fishgold, 328 U.S. at 285 (deciding against the veteran, but still applying Boone to
state that legislation should be liberally construed for military personnel); Boone, 319 U.S.
at 575 (finding against the veteran, but for the first time noting that statutes benefitting
persons in the military should be liberally construed).
74. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118–20 (1994).
75. See, e.g., Fishgold, 328 U.S. 275 (rejecting an honorably discharged veteran’s claim
under the Selective Service Act).
76. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
77. 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
78. Chevron involved a question about the Clean Air Act. Id. The provision of the Act
at issue required permits when a plant wished to modify or build a “stationary source” of
pollution. Id. at 840. “Stationary source” was not defined in the act. Id. at 841. Thus, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the agency in charge of administering the Act, had to
interpret the term. Id. at 843. It issued two notice and comment regulations interpreting
“stationary source.” Id. The first regulation defined “stationary source” as the construction
or installation of any new or modified equipment that emitted air pollutants. Id. at 840 n.2.
But the following year, the EPA repealed that regulation and issued a new one that
expanded the definition to encompass a plant-wide or “bubble concept” definition. Id. at
858. The bubble concept interpretation allowed a plant to offset increased air pollutant
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Agency’s interpretation of specific language in the Clean Air Act was
valid.79 The Court upheld the agency’s interpretation, creating the two-step
deference framework.80 Under the first step, a court should determine
“whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”81
When applying this first step, courts should not defer to agencies.82 Rather,
“[t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory
construction . . . .”83 Assuming Congress was unclear, then, pursuant to
step two, a court must accept any “reasonable” agency interpretation, even
if the court believes a different policy choice would be better.84 Chevron’s
two-step analysis was an entirely new deference standard from the existing
standard, one very deferential to agencies.
The Court justified increasing the level of deference given to agencies
for three reasons. First, the Court reasoned that agency personnel are
experts in their fields, whereas judges are not.85 Congress entrusts agencies
to implement law in a particular area because of this expertise.86 Scientists
and analysts working for the Food and Drug Administration, for example,
are more knowledgeable about food safety and drug effectiveness than are
judges. Because agency personnel are specialists in their field, they are in a
better position to implement effective public policy.87 The Court believed
that judges were more limited in both their knowledge of complex topics
and their method for gathering such information.88 While agencies can
develop policy using a wide array of methods, courts are limited to the
adversarial process.89 Therefore, deferring to the experts made sense to the
Supreme Court.90 Second, Congress simply cannot legislate every detail of

emissions at one part of its plant so long as it reduced emissions at another part of the plant.
Under the new interpretation, as long as total emissions at the plant remained constant, no
permit was required. Id. at 852. Not surprisingly, environmentalists sued.
79. Id. at 852.
80. Id. at 842.
81. Id. In other words, is Congress’s intent clear—however clarity may be discerned—
or is there a gap or ambiguity to be resolved? According to the Court, clarity was to be
determined by “employing traditional tools of statutory construction.” Id. at 843 n.9.
82. Id. at 842–43.
83. Id. at 843 n.9.
84. Id. at 843–44. Deference to the agency under Chevron’s second step is much
higher. Indeed, if a litigant challenges an agency interpretation and loses at step one—
meaning the court finds ambiguity— that litigant will likely lose the case. According to one
empirical study from 1995–1996, agencies prevail at step one forty-two percent of the time
and at step two eighty-nine percent of the time. Orin S. Kerr, Shedding Light on Chevron:
An Empirical Study of the Chevron Doctrine in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 15 YALE J. ON
REG. 1, 31 (1998).
85. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 865.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 866.
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a comprehensive regulatory scheme.91 Gaps and ambiguities are inevitable;
when Congress delegates responsibility for the regulatory area to an
agency, that agency must fill and resolve these gaps and ambiguities.92 In
Chevron, the Court presumed that when Congress leaves gaps and
ambiguities, it impliedly delegates to the agency the authority to resolve
them.93 Finally, administrative officials, unlike federal judges, have a
political constituency to which they are accountable and thus, the Court
reasoned, federal judges “have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices
made by [administrative officials].”94
After Chevron, deference became an “all-or-nothing grant of power from
Congress.”95 Either Congress was clear when it drafted the statute and no
deference would be due to the agency’s interpretation, or Congress was
unclear when it drafted the statute and complete deference would be due to
the agency’s reasonable interpretation.96 If this two-step deference
standard applies, then there is simply no place for King’s “tie goes to the
Veteran” presumption.
D. Gardner’s Presumption
Ten years after deciding Chevron, the Supreme Court referred to its King
dictum in Brown v. Gardner, a case that made “Gardner’s Presumption”
common parlance in veterans law.97 For the first time, the Court used
Boone’s interpretive canon (as reformulated in King) in a case involving a
challenge to an agency’s—in this case, the VA’s—interpretation of a
statute.98 Yet, the Court seemed oblivious to the conflict between its
direction in this case and its direction in Chevron.
Gardner’s facts are simple. Brown, a veteran, had back surgery in a VA
facility for a medical condition unrelated to his military service.99 After the
surgery, he developed pain and weakness in one leg; he sought disability
benefits under 38 U.S.C. § 1151, which provided compensation for “‘an
injury or an aggravation of an injury’ that occurs ‘as the result of
hospitalization, medical or surgical treatment’” not attributable to the
veteran’s “willful misconduct.”100 The VA had issued a regulation
interpreting this statute to cover an injury only if it arose from fault or
91. Id. at 843–44.
92. Id. at 843.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 866.
95. Linda D. Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to
Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 739 (2007) [hereinafter Chevron’s Demise].
96. Id.
97. 513 U.S. 115 (1994).
98. Id. at 117–18.
99. Id. at 116.
100. Id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994)).
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accident on the part of the VA.101 Pursuant to this regulation, the VA
denied Brown’s claim, stating that the statute, as interpreted by the
regulation, required “fault-or-accident.”102 The Veterans Court reversed,
finding that the statute did not contain such a requirement.103 The Federal
Circuit affirmed.104
The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that the regulation was
inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.105 While the Court
should have applied Chevron’s two steps to analyze whether to defer to the
VA’s interpretation in its regulation, the Court did not do so explicitly.106
Rather, the Court simply looked to the text of the statute, found the
language clear and found that language inconsistent with the VA’s
regulation.107 Essentially, the Court applied Chevron’s first step and
stopped, but the Court certainly did not explain that it was applying
Chevron.108
After finding the language clear, the Court stated in dictum that even if
the government could show ambiguity⎯which the government could
not⎯any “interpretive doubt [was] to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.”109
In so doing, the Court cited the footnote dictum from King.110 The Court
thus transformed Boone’s interpretive canon from a directive to courts to
interpret veterans’ benefits statutes liberally into a directive to courts to
resolve any interpretive doubt in the veteran-litigant’s favor—even in the
face of a contrary agency interpretation.111 In essence, with its dicta in both
King and Gardner, the Court created a “tie-to-the-veteran” presumption
with little explanation or awareness of the potential conflict with Chevron.
Importantly, Boone, Fishgold, and King did not involve an agency
interpretation of a statute.112 Also, none of the subsequent Supreme Court
cases in which the majority cited either Boone or Fishgold involved VA

101. Id. at 117 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.358(c)(3) (1993)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 118–20.
106. Indeed, the first time the Court cites Chevron is toward the end of the opinion, when
the Court quotes another case, Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409
(1993), which quotes Chevron. Id. at 120. Only in the very last paragraph does the Court
cite Chevron for justification for the Court’s refusal to defer. Id. at 122.
107. See id. at 117–20 (dismissing the VA’s claim that “injury” includes a fault
requirement).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 118.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 117–18.
112. See King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 217 (1991) (analyzing a hospital’s
interpretation of a statute); Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp, 328 U.S. 275, 279
(1946) (analyzing an arbitrator’s interpretation of a statute); Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S.
561 (1943) (analyzing a trial court’s interpretation of a statute).
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interpretations of statutes.113 Rather, all involved situations in which the
veteran114 sued or was sued by a private individual or entity115 or by a city
or state government.116 Perhaps in these situations, Gardner’s Presumption
was appropriate.117 However, when a federal agency like the VA interprets
a statute, Chevron should come into play. The Supreme Court failed to
recognize this conflict in Gardner, and for many years the lower courts
similarly failed to notice it.
While it is not exactly clear why the Supreme Court modified Gardner’s
Presumption from its liberal construction beginnings to its super-strong
formulation, the history of judicial review in this area offers a potential
explanation. When the Court decided Gardner in 1994, judicial review of
VA decisions was only six years old.118 Possibly, the Court developed
Gardner’s Presumption to help ease the transition to judicial review and to
help maintain the pro-claimant nature of veterans law. The Presumption
might have served as a transitional doctrine; it was easy to apply and
favored veterans. It gave both the VA and the Veterans Court an easy
default. However, to the extent that the Presumption was ever to have
super-strength, the time has now passed as the VA has been subject to
judicial review for nearly twenty-five years.119 Moreover, as this Article
discusses below, Gardner’s Presumption has morphed well beyond this
possible purpose.
III. GARDNER’S PRESUMPTION IN THE COURTS
For a pro-claimant, young judicial system, Gardner’s Presumption likely
appeared as an easy, bright-line, veteran-friendly interpretive rule. Thus,
shortly after the Supreme Court decided Gardner, the Veterans Court and
Federal Circuit cited the Presumption relatively regularly, although they

113. See supra notes 102–104.
114. But see Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 542, 550–
51 (1983) (discussing that nonprofit organization not representing veterans sought
declaratory judgment that it qualified for tax exempt status after its application was denied
by Internal Revenue Service).
115. See, e.g., King, 502 U.S. at 215 (dealing with a declaratory judgment brought by a
private employer to determine whether employer had to hold open job for military employee
who was to be stationed for three years); Ala. Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 582 (1977)
(involving suit between veteran and private employer to obtain credit with respect to
pension plan for the time veteran spent in the military); Le Maistre v. Leffers, 333 U.S. 1, 3
(1948) (involving suit between veteran and new land owner to set aside tax deed).
116. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 514 (1993) (involving suit of Army
officer on active duty against town and property’s purchasers to quiet title); Dameron v.
Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322, 323 (1953) (involving suit between Army officer and City and
County of Denver).
117. See infra Part V.B.
118. See Helfer, supra note 24, at 162–65 (discussing the creation of the Veterans’ Court
in 1988, which allowed for VA decisions to be reviewed).
119. Id.
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did not seem to know exactly what to do with it. This next section explores
how the Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit used Gardner’s
Presumption until they recognized that it conflicted with Chevron.
A. The Veterans Court’s Use of Gardner’s Presumption
While Gardner’s Presumption quickly became a legend in veterans
jurisprudence, the Veterans Court used it inconsistently. The court
occasionally used the Presumption as the primary support for its
More habitually, the court used the Presumption as
holdings.120
supplemental support for its holdings,121 simply noting the Presumption in
passing.122 Finally, the court often failed to mention the Presumption at all
when the court’s holding supported the VA’s position rather than the
veteran’s position.123 Some examples of each of these uses follow.
1.

Gardner’s Presumption as primary support
While rare, the Veterans Court has used Gardner’s Presumption as
primary support for its holding; yet, the court commonly cites the
Presumption with little analysis or explanation. For example, in Carpenter
v. Principi,124 the issue for the court was whether an attorney could recover
both a thirty percent contingency fee and an Equal Access to Justice Act
(“EAJA”) award for work on the same case.125 The EAJA allows litigants,
including veterans, to receive attorneys’ fees and expenses when they
prevail in litigation against the government so long as they meet certain
requirements.126 The VA had held that this dual award was “excessive and

120. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 64, 76 (2001) (holding that an attorney
could not recover contingency fees and Equal Access to Justice Fees for one case).
121. See, e.g., Nielson v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 56, 59 (2009) (using Gardner’s
Presumption as supplemental support), aff’d 607 F.3d 802 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Osman v.
Peake, 22 Vet. App. 252, 259 (2008) (indicating that even if the issue were a “close one,”
the court was required to resolve any interpretive doubt “in the veteran’s favor” (citing
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 120 (1994))); Otero-Castro v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 375,
380 (2002) (applying Gardner’s Presumption to resolve ambiguity in favor of veteran);
McCormick v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 39, 47 (2000) (citing Gardner’s Presumption to support
court’s holding that Secretary had authority to interpret 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) to assist
veterans in making a well-grounded claim).
122. E.g., Jackson v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 27, 34 (2009) (noting the presumption, but
not discussing it); Hartness v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 216, 221 (2006) (noting only that the
court was “mindful that any ambiguity in interpretation must be resolved in the veteran’s
favor”); accord Nielson v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 56, 59 (2009), aff’d 607 F.3d 802, 808
(Fed. Cir. 2010); Abbey v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 282, 290 (2003).
123. See, e.g., Theiss v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 204, 206 (2004) (failing to mention the
presumption other than to note that the veteran mentioned it); Gomez v. Principi, 17 Vet.
App. 369, 375 (2003) (ignoring Gardner’s Presumption altogether, although the
concurrence did refer to it).
124. 15 Vet. App. 64 (2001).
125. Id. at 69.
126. Applicants must meet the following requirements: (1) show that they were the
prevailing party; (2) show that they are financially eligible for the award; (3) allege that the
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unreasonable.”127
At issue for the Veterans Court was whether the legal work the attorney
performed before the court and the legal work the attorney subsequently
performed after the veteran’s case was remanded to the VA were “the same
work.”128 If they were the same work, then the double award was
impermissible because the court “would improperly be allowing the EAJA
fee to enhance the [attorney’s] fee, rather than to reimburse the veteran for
the cost of representation.”129
Without first finding the language in the statute to be ambiguous and
without offering any explanation as to why Gardner’s Presumption applied
when the EAJA is a generally applicable statute and not a veterans benefit
statute, the court cited Gardner’s Presumption simply to support its holding
that whenever an attorney represents a client in a claim, all work on that
claim should be considered the same work.130 The court reasoned only that
“[i]f there is any room for interpretive doubt as to what constitutes the
‘same work’ for the purposes of EAJA, such doubt must be resolved in the
veterans’ favor.”131 The court offered no further analysis.
The dissents criticized the majority’s lack of analysis. Chief Judge
Kramer noted that “the majority . . . fails to provide adequate analysis and
legal support for its holding . . . .”132 Judge Steinberg lamented, “[t]he
opinion’s principal stated justification for the interpretive leap of equating
‘same work’ with ‘same claim’ seems to be a citation to Brown v.
Gardner . . . .”133
In addition, Judge Steinberg questioned whether
Gardner’s Presumption had any applicability when there was no
interpretive doubt or ambiguity.134 In short, the dissents noted that
Gardner’s Presumption provided no support for the majority’s holding.135
The majority offered no response to these criticisms. Notably, Chevron
was not an issue in this case.
Similarly, the Veterans Court used Gardner’s Presumption as primary
support in two other cases in which Chevron did not apply. In the first

government’s position was not substantially justified; and (4) provide an itemized statement
of the fees sought. Bazalo v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 304, 308, rev’d sub nom. Bazalo v. West,
150 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing Lematta v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 504 (1996)).
127. Carpenter, 15 Vet. App. at 66.
128. Id. at 72. (citing Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572,
106 Stat. 4506 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2000)).
129. Id. at 76.
130. Carpenter, 15 Vet. App. at 76.
131. Id. at 76 (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)). The interpretation
was veteran-friendly because the overpayment was returned to the veteran. Id. at 66.
132. Id. at 94 (Kramer, C.J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 90 (Steinberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
134. Id.
135. See supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text.
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case, Otero-Castro v. Principi,136 the court reviewed the VA’s denial of a
veteran’s request for an increased disability rating for his service-connected
heart disease.137 The facts are more complicated than merit discussion
here. In short, the court found the applicable regulation ambiguous,
rejected the VA’s interpretation, and adopted the veteran’s interpretation
solely because “interpretive doubt is to be resolved in favor of the
claimant . . . .”138 Because the VA had interpreted its own regulation in this
case, rather than a statute, Chevron did not apply.139 The court assumed,
but did not explain, that Gardner’s Presumption, which applies to
interpretations of ambiguous statutes, should also apply to interpretations
of ambiguous regulations.140 While there is good reason to believe that
Gardner’s Presumption should not apply in cases evaluating the VA’s
interpretation of its regulations,141 the court cited Gardner’s Presumption as
the primary support for its holding.142
In the second case, Cottle v. Principi,143 the issue was whether a veteran
who had been injured while working as an employee of the Dallas transit
system while receiving VA rehabilitation employment services was injured
in “the pursuit of a course of vocational rehabilitation . . . .”144 Neither the
statute nor the implementing regulations defined the italicized phrase.145
Moreover, the legislative history was similarly not illuminating.146
136. 16 Vet. App. 375 (2002).
137. Id. at 376.
138. Id. at 382 (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)).
139. Traditionally, courts defer almost completely to an agency’s interpretation of its
own regulation because the agency wrote the regulation. See generally JELLUM, MASTERING
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 59 at 227–29 (explaining that agencies have the
experience and flexibility necessary to properly interpret their own regulations). In 1945,
the Supreme Court held that an agency’s interpretation of its regulation would have
“controlling weight unless it [was] plainly erroneous.” Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). This high level of deference should come as no surprise
since it was the agency that drafted the regulation in the first place. The Court reasoned that
when Congress delegates the authority to promulgate regulations, it also delegates the
authority to interpret those regulations. Id. Such power is a necessary corollary to the
former. This substantial level of deference is generally known as either Seminole Rock or
Auer deference. The latter term refers to the Supreme Court case of Auer v. Robbins, 519
U.S. 452 (1997), which followed Chevron and confirmed that Seminole Rock deference had
survived Chevron. Auer, 519 U.S. at 461–63.
140. Otero-Castro, 16 Vet. App. at 382.
141. If an agency’s interpretation of its regulation must be “plainly wrong” before the
court can reject that interpretation, there can be little place for Gardner’s Presumption; the
VA’s interpretation would have to be plainly wrong before it was rejected. Thus, Gardner’s
Presumption not only conflicts with Chevron deference, it also conflicts with Auer
deference. Yet, in Otero-Castro, the Veterans Court rejected the VA’s interpretation
without mentioning or even citing Auer. Id.
142. Id.
143. 14 Vet. App. 329 (2001).
144. Id. at 332 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994)).
145. Id. at 332–34 (citing 38 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 3101 & 38 C.F.R. §§ 21.210, 21.268,
21.283 (2000)).
146. Id. at 334.
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Chevron deference was not appropriate in this case because the only VA
interpretation of the statue at issue was made in a Precedent Opinion issued
by the VA General Counsel.147 Chevron is not appropriate when agencies
interpret statutes in this manner.148 The general counsel memorandum
concluded that a “participant who is receiving only a period of employment
services while engaged in post-training employment is not pursuing ‘a
course of vocational rehabilitation’ within the meaning of [the statute] so as
to qualify for disability compensation benefits under that section.”149
While acknowledging that interpretations contained within VA regulations
would be entitled to deference, the court correctly noted that it owed no
deference to “an opinion prepared exclusively for adjudication or litigation
of a particular claim . . . .”150
The court then rejected the VA’s
interpretation, citing Gardner’s Presumption.151 The court was blunt:
although the general counsel had acknowledged that the statute could be
read broadly to cover the veteran’s injury, she chose to interpret the statute
narrowly.152 The court rejected her choice and chastised her for “fail[ing]
to discuss or consider Gardner at all.”153
Importantly, in this case the Veterans Court expanded the application of
Gardner’s Presumption beyond the courtroom. Specifically, the court
stressed that Gardner’s Presumption required not only courts but also the
VA to “resolv[e] any interpretative doubt in favor of the veteran . . . .”154
For the first time, the court suggested that Gardner’s Presumption placed
an affirmative duty on the VA, in addition to or perhaps instead of the
court, to resolve interpretive doubt in favor of the veteran before a case was
even litigated.155
While intriguing, this expansion of Gardner’s
Presumption has yet to reappear in the court’s jurisprudence; yet, as I will
explain below, this approach to Gardner’s Presumption resolves the
conflict and balances the competing interests.156
Despite these three cases, the Veterans Court rarely uses Gardner’s
Presumption as the primary support for its holdings. More commonly, the
court refers to the Presumption merely as additional, or back-up, support.

147. Id. at 331.
148. For a discussion of when Chevron applies and when it does not, see generally,
JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 59, at 225–26.
149. Cottle, 14 Vet. App. at 331 (quoting VA Gen Coun. Prec. 14-97 (Apr. 7, 1997)).
150. Id. at 335.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 336.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See id. (tasking the VA General Counsel to “discuss or consider Gardner” prior to
litigation).
156. See infra Part V.
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2.

Gardner’s Presumption as supplemental support
The Veterans Court used Gardner’s Presumption as supplemental
support for its holding favoring the veteran-litigants in a number of cases.
For example, in Allen v. Brown,157 the court had to determine whether the
VA properly denied benefits to a veteran who claimed that a service-related
injury to his right knee had aggravated non-service-connected injuries in
his left knee and hips.158 The issue for the court was whether the term
“disability” in 38 U.S.C. § 1110 included non-service-related injuries
aggravated by service-related injuries.159 The statute provided that veterans
would receive compensation for “disability resulting from personal injury
suffered or disease contracted in line of duty, or for aggravation of a
preexisting injury suffered or disease contracted in line of duty . . . .160
Additionally, a VA regulation interpreting this statute provided:
“[d]isability which is proximately due to or the result of a serviceconnected disease or injury shall be service connected.”161 Because
“disability” was not clearly defined in either the statute or the regulation to
include or to exclude aggravation of non-service-related injuries, the court
correctly interpreted the statute without giving any deference to the
agency’s regulation.
Instead, the court turned to its holding in an earlier case, Hunt v.
Derwinski,162 in which the court found the VA’s interpretation of the term
“disability” for another statute to be reasonable.163 The court adopted the
same interpretation of “disability” for both statutes.164 Notably, the court’s
reasoning did not automatically flow from the Hunt holding.165 Thus, to
further support its interpretation, the court cited Gardner’s Presumption.166
Without discussion, the court simply noted that “resolving doubt between
157. 7 Vet. App. 439 (1995).
158. Id. at 440.
159. The Veterans Court had actually interpreted the statute to deny coverage for
aggravated injuries in an earlier case, Leopoldo v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 216, 218–19 (1993),
but that opinion directly contradicted the holding in an earlier case decided by the Veterans
Court, Tobin v. Derwinski, 2 Vet App. 34 (1991), in which the court had held that
aggravated injuries were covered. Id. at 39. To resolve the conflicting case law, the Court
decided the Allen case en banc. Allen, 7 Vet. App. at 445–46.
160. Id. at 446 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2000)).
161. Id. at 446 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a) (1994)).
162. 1 Vet. App. 292 (1991).
163. Allen, 7 Vet. App. at 447 (citing Hunt v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 292 (1991)
(interpreting 38 U.S.C. § 1153)).
164. Id. at 448 (citing Hunt, 1 Vet. App. at 296). According to the Allen and Hunt
courts, the VA’s definition was reasonable because it furthered the purpose of the veterans’
compensation law, which rates different injuries based upon diminished earning capacity.
Id.
165. In Allen, the court concluded that because statutes should be interpreted in statutory
context and because these two statutes (§ 1110 and § 1153) were located within the same
title of the code, the same definition should apply to both. Id.
166. Id.
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[the two interpretations available in this case] requires that such doubt be
resolved in favor . . . of the veteran.”167 Thus, in Allen, Gardner’s
Presumption served as a back-up citation for the court’s primary reasoning.
Similarly, in Davenport v. Brown,168 the Veterans Court referred to
Gardner’s Presumption as an afterthought to its primary reasoning. In that
case, the court had to determine whether a vocational rehabilitation benefits
entitlement statute (38 U.S.C. § 3102) required a veteran’s serviceconnected disability to “materially contribute” to the veteran’s employment
handicap.169 In other words, the court considered whether the statute
required a causal connection between the injury and the inability to work.
The VA had, by regulation, interpreted the statute to require this causal
connection.170 Because the VA had interpreted the statute by regulation,
Chevron applied. Pursuant to Chevron’s first step, the court rejected the
VA’s regulation as contrary to the clear statutory text.171 The court then
bolstered this reasoning by stating, “[s]econd, even were we to find any
ambiguity, which we do not, the Supreme Court has counseled strongly that
‘interpretative doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.’”172 As it had
in Allen, the Veterans Court offered no further reasoning, explanation, or
elaboration for how Gardner’s Presumption dictated the outcome in
Davenport. Importantly, had the court found ambiguity, the court would
have been obligated under Chevron’s second step to adopt the agency’s
interpretation, assuming it was reasonable.173 Nevertheless, the potential
conflict between Chevron and Gardner went unnoticed.
These cases and many others174 show that the Veterans Court regularly
referred to Gardner’s Presumption as an afterthought, using “even-if”
language, and offered little if any analysis of how the Presumption applied
to the facts of each case. Essentially, the court offered no more than its
agreement with the veteran’s interpretation as proof that it was correctly
applying Gardner’s Presumption.175 Likely, when the court had already
167. Id. (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)).
168. 7 Vet. App. 476 (1995).
169. Id. at 477.
170. Id. at 480 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 21.51(c)(2) (1994)).
171. Id. at 481.
172. Id. at 484 (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)).
173. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984) (stating that if Congress has not addressed a precise question, statutory interpretation
falls to the relevant agency).
174. E.g., Chandler v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 23, 28 (2010) (mentioning Gardner’s
Presumption in one sentence as a presumption to be mindful of); Osman v. Peake, 22 Vet.
App. 252, 259 (2008) (stating that “even if” the question were a close one, Gardner required
the court to find in the veteran’s favor); accord Ramsey v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 16, 35
(2006); Smith v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 63, 78 (2005); Kilpatrick v. Principi, 16 Vet. App.
1, 6 (2002); Ryan v. West, 13 Vet. App. 151, 157 (1999); Dippel v. West, 12 Vet. App. 466,
472 (1999); Green v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 111, 118 (1997).
175. See cases cited supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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resolved the issue in the veteran’s favor, Gardner’s Presumption lent
additional supportive reasoning for the court’s holding, so the court felt no
need to explain its citation further.
3.

Gardner’s Presumption missing from the analysis
When the Veterans Court resolved the issue in the VA’s favor rather
than the veteran’s favor, however, the court often ignored the Presumption
altogether.176 For example, in Morton v. West,177 a veteran appealed a VA
decision that held the veteran’s claims were not well-grounded.178 The
veteran alleged on appeal that the VA was required to help him develop
facts to support his case even though he did not submit a well-grounded
claim.179 Yet, the statute in effect at the time was very clear to the contrary.
The statute provided:
(a) Except when otherwise provided . . . a person who submits a claim
for benefits under a law administered by the secretary shall have the
burden of submitting evidence sufficient to justify a belief by a fair and
impartial individual that the claim is well grounded. The Secretary shall
assist such a claimant in developing facts pertinent to the claims.
(b) . . . . Nothing in this subsection shall be construed as shifting from
the claimant to the Secretary the burden specified in subsection (a) of
this section.180

The Secretary, interpreting this statute by regulation, had obligated the
VA to help a claimant regardless of whether the claimant had submitted a
well-grounded claim. Specifically, one regulation indicated that “‘[i]t is
the obligation of VA to assist a claimant in developing the facts pertinent to
the claim . . . .’”181 Another regulation provided that “‘[a]lthough it is the
responsibility of any person filing a claim . . . the [VA] shall assist a
claimant in developing the facts pertinent to his or her claim.’”182
Additionally, VA policy statements further obligated the VA to help in all
176. E.g., McGrath v. Gober, 14 Vet. App. 28 (2000). In McGrath, the majority held
that a veteran could use medical evidence submitted after a claim was filed to establish an
earlier effective date for compensation. Id. at 35–36. In so holding, the majority vacated
the Board’s determination and remanded, but did not cite Gardner. Judge Steinberg
concurred in the holding but not the reasoning and mentioned Gardner’s Presumption in his
analysis. Id. at 38 n.1, 39 (Steinberg, J., concurring and dissenting); accord Henderson v.
Peake, 22 Vet. App. 217, 221 (2008) (dismissing appeal without citing Gardner).
177. 12 Vet. App. 477 (1999).
178. Id. at 478. Parenthetically, in 2000, the Veterans’ Claims Assistance Act repealed
this “well-grounded” requirement for claims, restated VA’s duty to assist the claimant to
develop all evidence pertinent to the claim, and required VA to inform the claimant at each
step of the claims process as to what the VA will do and what the claimant must do to
develop evidence sufficient to determine the merits of the claim. 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a).
179. Morton, 12 Vet. App. at 479–80. Even though the veteran had not properly raised
this issue on appeal, the court heard it. Id. at 479–80.
180. Id. at 480 (emphasis added) (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a), (b) (1994)).
181. Id. at 481 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.103 (1998)).
182. Id. (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.159 (1998)).
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cases, regardless of whether the claim was well-grounded.183
The issue for the Veterans Court was whether the VA’s interpretation, as
contained in both the regulations and the policy statements, was
controlling. Applying the first step of Chevron, the court found the statute
was clear: the VA was obligated to assist only those claimants who
submitted well-grounded claims.184 For this reason, the court held that the
VA had no authority to promulgate the inconsistent regulations and policy
statements.185 Thus, the court held against the veteran; in so doing, the
court failed to mention Gardner’s Presumption. The court ignored the
Presumption even though the court quoted another part of the Gardner case
to support its statement that a regulation that “‘flies against the plain
language of the statutory text, exempts courts from any obligation to defer
to it.’”186 It is unclear why the court failed to mention Gardner’s
Presumption. The court likely failed to do so because the statute was not
ambiguous at Chevron’s step one. However, it would have been helpful for
the court to note that fact, as it did in Davenport v. Brown.187
Similarly, in Bazalo v. Brown,188 the EAJA was again at issue.189
Remember that the EAJA allows litigants to receive attorneys’ fees and
expenses when they prevail in litigation against the government.190 The
issue in Bazalo was whether the attorney-applicants had to submit a
complete, non-defective application within the thirty-day time frame to
receive compensation or whether they could correct a defective application
after the thirty-day time frame.191 The Veterans Court held that a defective
application could not be corrected after the thirty-day time frame.192 In so
holding, the majority relied on another canon of statutory interpretation,
namely that “waiver[s] of the sovereign immunity of the United States . . .
are to be strictly construed in the government’s favor.”193 The majority did
not mention Gardner’s Presumption. Again, it is unclear why, but one
183. Id. at 481 (citing Manual M21-1, Part III ¶ 1.03(a)).
184. Id. at 485.
185. Id.
186. Id. (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 122 (1994)).
187. See 7 Vet. App. 476, 481 (1995) (recognizing that the “proper starting point” is to
examine the language of the statute, and that consideration of the matter ends when
congressional intent is clear).
188. 9 Vet. App. 304 (1996), rev’d sub nom. Bazalo v. West, 150 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
189. Id. Because the VA is not the agency administering the EAJA, the VA would not
be entitled to Chevron deference for its interpretations of the EAJA. At best, it would be
entitled to Skidmore deference. See Linda D. Jellum, The United States Court of Appeals
for Veterans’ Claims: Has it Mastered Chevron’s Step Zero?, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 67, 85–
86 (2011) [hereinafter Chevron’s Step Zero].
190. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (describing relevant requirements for
receiving attorneys’ fees).
191. Bazalo, 9 Vet. App. at 308.
192. Id.
193. Id. (citing Grivois v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 100, 101 (1994)).
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possibility for the omission is that the court’s choice of interpretive
canon—that waivers of immunity be strictly construed—directly
contradicted Gardner’s Presumption.194
In contrast to the majority, the dissent did refer to Gardner’s
Presumption: “Not only does [the majority’s] approach frustrate the will of
Congress in expressly making the EAJA applicable to this Court, but it also
contradicts the Supreme Court’s recent charge that in construing a statute
‘interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.’”195 The dissent
disagreed with the majority’s decision to adopt a “narrow” interpretation of
the statute when balanced with “the interests of veterans.”196 Thus, the
majority completely ignored Gardner’s Presumption, which the dissent
found dispositive.
Similarly, in Wright v. Gober,197 the Veterans Court did not mention
Gardner’s Presumption when it held for the VA. The issue for the court
was the correct effective date for a veteran’s disability rating.198 The
veteran filed a claim shortly after he was discharged in 1954, but the VA
denied the claim.199 In 1990, the veteran applied to reopen the 1954 claim;
the VA granted this award with an effective date of 1990.200 The veteran
appealed, arguing that the effective date should be 1954.201 The relevant
statute provided that “[t]he effective date of an award of disability
compensation to a veteran shall be the day following the date of the
veteran’s discharge of release if application therefor is received within one
year from such date of discharge or release.”202 The majority found this
language clear and supportive of the VA’s interpretation because although
the veteran’s initial claim was filed within one year of his discharge, it was
denied, and the subsequent claim was filed 35 years later.203 Although the
majority again quoted the Gardner case for a different point, the majority
did not mention Gardner’s Presumption.204 The majority could have
194. Arguably, Gardner’s Presumption was inapplicable because the EAJA is not a
veterans’ benefits statute (it is a generally applicable statute), but the courts have never
recognized this limitation.
195. Bazalo, 9 Vet. App. at 314–15 (Steinberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994)).
196. Id. at 315. The dissent rejected the majority’s reliance on the strict construction
canon, saying that such reliance was inapplicable when the government by statute had
waived its immunity, as it had with the EAJA. Id. In other words, once Congress has
waived immunity, then courts should not “‘assume the authority to narrow the waiver’”
even further. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117–18 (1979)).
197. 10 Vet. App. 343 (1997).
198. Id. at 345.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 346 (quoting 38 U.S.C. 5110(b)(1)(1994)).
203. Id. at 346–47.
204. Id. at 347.
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helpfully indicated that the Presumption was inapplicable because the
statute was unambiguous; however, the majority provided no such
explanation. In contrast, the dissent cited Gardner’s Presumption as
additional support for its plain meaning interpretation of the statute.205
These cases illustrate that when the Veterans Court interprets a statute in
a way that is contrary to the veteran’s position, the court routinely omits
any discussion of Gardner’s Presumption. Often when the court fails to
mention Gardner’s Presumption, the court first finds the statute
unambiguous.206 When the statute is clear, Gardner’s Presumption is
inapplicable,207 so the court’s approach is arguably sound. However, the
court has inconsistently explained why the Presumption is inapplicable.208
Moreover, it is unlikely the statutes are as clear as the court suggests;
indeed, in each of these cases, the dissent found the statutes ambiguous and
turned to Gardner’s Presumption.209 At a minimum, it would be helpful to
know why the majority ignored a presumption the dissent found
dispositive.
In sum, a review of all the Veterans Court’s cases until 2002—when the
court first acknowledged the conflict between Gardner’s Presumption and
Chevron—demonstrates that the court used Gardner’s Presumption
inconsistently, offering little guidance to future litigants. First, the court
does not distinguish between those cases involving agency interpretations
subject to Chevron deference and those not subject to Chevron deference.
Second, the court most commonly cited the Presumption simply as back-up
support, with little to no explanation of how the Presumption applied in a
given case. Finally, when the court agreed with the VA or found the
statutory language at issue clear, the court failed to mention the
Presumption altogether. This inconsistency is hardly surprising, however,
for it comes from a young court struggling to apply incompatible Supreme
Court precedents.

205. Id. at 351 (Kramer, J., dissenting) (noting that a VA position interpreting ambiguity
would have to account for Gardner); see also Brown v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 290, 297
(2007) (holding for VA and not mentioning Gardner’s Presumption).
206. See, e.g., Wright v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 343, 351 (1997) (Kramer, J. dissenting)
(supporting a plain meaning interpretation of the statute).
207. See Terry v. Principi, 340 F.3d 1378, 1384 & n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (rejecting
Gardner as justification where language was clear and unambiguous).
208. Compare Davenport v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 476 (1995) (explaining why the
Presumption did not apply) with Wright, 10 Vet. App. at 437 (failing to recognize Gardner’s
relevance).
209. See Wright, 10 Vet. App. at 349–50 (noting that discerning the plain language
requires the dual consideration of the language and the structure of the statute); Bazalo v.
Brown, 9 Vet. App. 304, 316 (1996) (Steinberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(finding no plain meaning in the content requirements of EAJA), rev’d sub nom. Bazalo v.
West, 150 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
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B. The Federal Circuit’s Use of Gardner’s Presumption
The Federal Circuit has limited authority to review interpretations of
statutes made by the Veterans Court;210 thus, the Federal Circuit must also
interpret veterans’ benefits statutes. When it does so, the court has referred
to Gardner’s Presumption more consistently, even if less frequently, than
the Veterans Court.211 For example, in contrast to the Veterans Court, the
Federal Circuit has cited Gardner’s Presumption regardless of whether the
court adopted the VA’s or veteran’s interpretation.212 Yet, like the
Veterans Court, the Federal Circuit has rarely analyzed the Presumption’s
application to the facts of a given case. Most commonly, the Federal
Circuit simply refers to Gardner’s Presumption to support its assertion that
veterans laws are veteran-friendly.213
The Federal Circuit cited Gardner’s Presumption for the first time in

210. The Federal Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions of the Veterans Court is limited
by statute. 38 U.S.C. § 7292. It has “exclusive jurisdiction to review and decide any
challenge to the validity of any statute or regulation or any interpretation thereof brought
under [section 7292], and to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions to the extent
presented and necessary to a decision.” 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c). It can review all relevant
questions of law and set aside a regulation or an interpretation of a regulation that is
arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law;
contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of statutory
jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or in violation of a statutory right; or without
observance of procedure required by law. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(1). The court has no
authority to review factual determinations or the application of a law or regulation to a
particular set of facts unless a constitutional issue is presented. 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).
211. See, e.g., Sursely v. Peake, 551 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (stating “in the
face of statutory ambiguity, we must apply the rule that ‘interpretive doubt is to be resolved
in the veteran’s favor’”) (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)); Principi,
340 F.3d at 1383 (reaffirming Gardner’s Presumption when ambiguously worded statutes
lead to interpretative doubt).
212. See, e.g., McNight v. Gober, 131 F.3d 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (per curiam). But see
Bustos v. West, 179 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1999). In Bustos, the veteran sought review of the
VA’s interpretation of the term “clear and unmistakable error,” as provided in both a statute
and regulation. Id. at 1380 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a)(1999) and 38 U.S.C. § 5109A). The
Federal Circuit agreed with the VA and neither cited nor mentioned Gardner’s Presumption.
Id. at 1379–81. In petitioning for certiorari, the attorney for the veteran expansively argued
that “all veteran benefits statutes and regulations are to be construed in the veteran’s favor
and any interpretation to the contrary is invalid.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Bustos
v. West, 528 U.S. 967 (1999) (No. 99-443), 1999 WL 33640284, at *3. Further, the
attorney argued, wrongly, first, that neither King nor Gardner had required a threshold
finding of ambiguity and, second, that both King and Gardner had held that reviewing
courts must interpret statutes and regulations in veterans’ favor. See id. at *4–5 (“Such a
decision clearly misunderstands this Court’s holding [sic] in King and Gardner, which
provide that a reviewing court must construe all veterans’ benefits laws in the veteran’s
favor, regardless of any ambiguity.”) Neither assertion is correct: both King and Gardner
talked about interpretive doubt, or ambiguity, and both created the presumption in dictum.
See supra Part II.B. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Bustos, 528
U.S. 967.
213. See, e.g., Forshey v. Gober, 226 F.3d 1299, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000), rev’d sub nom,
Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that pro-veteran legal
presumptions reflect the compassionate intent of the veteran’s system).
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1997, three years after Gardner was decided. In McKnight v. Gober,214 a
veteran claimed he had service-connected asthma.215 When the VA denied
the claim, the veteran filed a claim to reopen but failed to provide “new and
material evidence not previously considered.”216 For this reason, the VA
denied the claim to reopen.217 On appeal, the veteran argued that the statute
obligated the VA to notify veterans of the extent and quality of evidence
necessary to prove a claim, whether the VA was aware of any such
evidence or not.218 Both the Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit
disagreed.219 The statute provided, in relevant part, “[i]f a claimant’s
application for benefits . . . is incomplete, the Secretary shall notify the
claimant of the evidence necessary to complete the application.”220 There
was no relevant interpreting regulation; therefore, Chevron did not apply.221
The Federal Circuit held that pursuant to the statute the VA need only
notify the veteran of the evidence needed to complete an application when
the VA knew of or should have known of the existence of any relevant
evidence.222 In rejecting the veteran’s very broad interpretation, the court
referred to Gardner’s Presumption: “Certainly, if there is ambiguity in the
statute, ‘interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.’
Nevertheless, the language of the provision does not suggest so broad an
obligation.”223 From this statement, it is not entirely clear whether the
court failed to find ambiguity, and thus found Gardner inapplicable, or
whether the court found that even if ambiguity existed, the veteran’s
interpretation did not comport with the statutory language. In any event, in
this case, the Federal Circuit referred to Gardner’s Presumption even
though it ultimately adopted the VA’s interpretation.224 In contrast, the
Veterans Court had failed to mention the Presumption when it held for the
VA.225
Just a year later, in Hodge v. West,226 the Federal Circuit again revisited
the issue of what evidence was required to reopen a denied claim. The VA
had concluded that “new” evidence a veteran submitted in support of his

214. 131 F.3d 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
215. Id. at 1483.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1484.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) (1994).
221. See infra Part V.D (discussing the inapplicability of Chevron when the litigation is
between a veteran and the VA and there are no regulations interpreting the statute).
222. McKnight, 131 F.3d at 1485.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See McKnight v. Brown, No. 96-0440 (Vet. App. March 27, 1997), aff’d sub nom.
McKnight v. Gober, 131 F.3d 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
226. 155 F.3d 1356 (1998).
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claim for service-connected arthritis was not “material”; the Veterans Court
agreed.227 The statute at issue provided that if “new and material evidence”
surfaced in connection with a disallowed claim, the claim would be
reopened for review.228 A VA regulation defined “new and material
evidence” as:
evidence not previously submitted to agency decision makers which
bears directly and substantially upon the specific matter under
consideration, which is neither cumulative nor redundant, and which by
itself or in connection with evidence previously assembled is so
significant that it must be considered in order to fairly decide the merits
of the claim.229

Despite the clarity of this regulation, the Veterans Court adopted and
applied a different standard.230 The Veterans Court’s standard required that
there be a reasonable possibility that the new evidence would change the
outcome.231 The Federal Circuit reversed, rejecting the Veteran Court’s
new standard.232 Unlike McKnight, Chevron applied in this case because
there was an interpreting regulation.233 Applying Chevron’s second step,
the Federal Circuit held that the Veterans Court should have deferred to the
VA’s reasonable definition of the ambiguous statutory term “new and
material evidence.”234 In addition, in a footnote, the Federal Circuit
supported its holding by referring to Gardner’s Presumption.
Our holding today is further supported by Brown v. Gardner . . . in
which the Supreme Court restated the general rule that any interpretive
doubt must be resolved in the veteran’s favor. Indeed, because the
regulation imposes a lower burden to reopen than the [Veterans Court’s]
test, the Secretary’s construction is also the construction most favorable
to the veteran.235

Importantly, in this case, the Federal Circuit applied Gardner’s
Presumption in a previously unapplied way:
the court used the
Presumption as a tie-breaker between the VA’s interpretation and the
Veterans Court’s interpretation.236 (The veteran had not offered an
interpretation.) Because the VA’s interpretation was more veteran-friendly
than the Veteran Court’s interpretation and was reasonable under Chevron,

227. Id. at 1358.
228. Id. at 1359 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5108 (1995)).
229. Id. (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a) (1994)(emphasis added)).
230. Id. at 1360. The Veterans Court borrowed from Social Security benefits law.
231. Id. at 1359–60.
232. Id. at 1360.
233. See infra Part V.D (noting that Chevron applies only where an agency implemented
a regulation interpreting a statute).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1361 n.1 (citations omitted).
236. Id.
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the VA’s interpretation controlled.237 The Federal Circuit did not address
the Chevron/Gardner conflict in this case because both pointed to the same
interpretation.238
The Federal Circuit again dodged the Chevron/Gardner conflict in Jones
v. West.239 In that case, the court concluded that the statutory language at
issue was clear and, thus, rejected the veteran’s interpretation.240 Because
the language was clear, the court indicated in a footnote that neither
Chevron nor Gardner applied because both required a threshold finding of
ambiguity.
[G]iven the plain meaning of the statutory provisions at issue, it is
irrelevant for purposes of this appeal whether deference is warranted
under Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, . . . . For similar
reasons, the mandate of Brown v. Gardner, . . . that “interpretive doubt is
to be resolved in the veteran’s favor” has no bearing on the resolution of
this case.241

The court did not recognize that the two doctrines conflicted; rather, the
court simply noted that ambiguity was a threshold finding for each
doctrine.242 It would take the court two more years to acknowledge the
conflict.243
IV. JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE CHEVRON/GARDNER CONFLICT
The Veterans Court and Federal Circuit’s more recent jurisprudence
shows two courts struggling first to notice that Gardner’s Presumption and
Chevron conflicted and, second, to resolve that conflict once they finally
identified it. Simply put, the Veterans Court has never adequately resolved
the conflict, exploring the issue most commonly in cases in which Chevron
did not apply. In contrast, the Federal Circuit acknowledged the conflict
earlier and attempted to resolve it in cases in which Chevron did apply.244
Ultimately, both courts have concluded that Chevron trumps Gardner’s
Presumption;245 however, neither court has explained why or whether
Gardner’s Presumption retains any vitality in light of this conclusion. The
sections below explore the courts’ awakening to the conflict and their
attempts to resolve it.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. 136 F.3d 1296 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
240. Id. at 1300.
241. Id. at 1299 n.2.
242. Id.; accord Terry v. Principi, 340 F.3d 1378, 1383 (2003) (recognizing that clarity
of the statute precludes the need to apply Gardner’s Presumption).
243. The Federal Circuit first noticed the conflict in Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351 (Fed.
Cir. 2000). See infra notes 325–330 and accompanying text.
244. See infra Part IV.B.
245. See infra Part IV.B.
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A. The Veterans Court Explores the Conflict
Until 2002, the Veterans Court seemed unaware of the conflict between
Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron. Then, in an unpublished opinion, the
Veterans Court identified the conflict and tried to resolve it in Jordan v.
Principi.246 In that case, a veteran suffered a knee injury in a motorcycle
accident before entering the military.247 Yet, the veteran failed to disclose
this injury upon entering service.248 When the injury flared up, the veteran
was treated and discharged for “erroneous enlistment.”249 At discharge, the
VA concluded that the injury was preexisting and was not aggravated by
military service.250 Instead of challenging the decision when it was issued
in 1983, the veteran waited almost fifteen years.251 When the veteran
moved in 1998 to have the 1983 decision revised or reversed based upon
clear and unmistakable error, the VA denied the motion.252
On appeal before the Veterans Court, the parties argued about the proper
interpretation of two statutes that both applied and yet conflicted.253 Trying
to reconcile these statutes long before this case, the VA had issued two
interpreting regulations.254 Because of the existence of the interpreting
regulations, the court correctly noted that Chevron was the appropriate
standard of review for determining whether the VA regulations were
reasonable interpretations of the two conflicting statutes.255 Importantly,
the court then noted for the first time the tension between Chevron and
Gardner, calling them “competing principles of statutory construction.”256
Applying Chevron’s second step, the court found the VA regulations to be
reasonable interpretations of the two statutes.257 The court then rejected the
veteran’s interpretation as “absurd.”258
Placing limits on Gardner’s Presumption for the first time, the court
noted that a veteran’s interpretation would not control when that
interpretation was unreasonable: “[W]e cannot blindly adopt a statutory
interpretation simply because it would be beneficial to some claimants if
that interpretation does not present a competing reasonable
246. 16 Vet. App. 335 (2002), withdrawn, No. 00-206, 2002 WL 31445159 (Nov. 1,
2002).
247. Id. at 336.
248. Id. at 337.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 337–38.
252. Id. at 338.
253. Id. at 343 (citing former 38 U.S.C. §§ 311, 353 (1979)).
254. Id. at 345 (citing 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.304(a) & 3.306(a) (1979)).
255. Id. at 346.
256. Id. at 345.
257. Id. at 348.
258. Id. at 347–48 (noting that the veteran’s interpretation “would have the Court read
[one statute] in isolation from [the other statute] in certain cases”).
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interpretation.”259 With this backdrop, the court tried to resolve the conflict
between Chevron and Gardner’s Presumption by suggesting that
Gardner’s Presumption should trump Chevron’s second step unless the
veteran’s interpretation was unreasonable.260 The court’s resolution of the
conflict—to apply Gardner’s Presumption when there are two reasonable
interpretations of an ambiguous statute and to otherwise apply Chevron—
has superficial appeal. Of course a court cannot adopt unreasonable and
absurd interpretations of statutes; hence, Gardner’s Presumption must yield
when the veteran proposes an unreasonable or absurd interpretation.261
Yet, the resolution simply does not work. Under Chevron, agencies have
the authority to interpret ambiguous statutes.262 If Congress is clear, then
Congress has interpreted the statute and, under Chevron’s first step, there is
no room for agencies, courts, or even veterans to interpret that statute
differently.263 Often, however, Congress is not clear. When Congress is
not clear, then agencies have the power, authority, and responsibility to
choose from among reasonable, competing interpretations.264 Agencies
have this power, not veterans. Moreover, agencies theoretically can select
only reasonable interpretations.265 An unreasonable interpretation would
never be acceptable whether the agency or the litigant provided it.
Resolving the conflict between Chevron and Gardner as the court
attempted to do in this case would essentially remove the VA from the
interpretive process. According to the court’s proposed solution, either
Congress was clear and Congress decided what the statute meant, or
Congress was unclear and the veteran can decide what the statute means, so
long as the veteran does not propose an unreasonable or absurd
interpretation. Under this proposed solution, the VA’s interpretation would
control only when it is the single, reasonable interpretation of a statute.
The court’s resolution falls short.266
259. Id. at 348.
260. Id.
[U]nder Brown v. Gardner, we must resolve interpretative doubt in favor of
claimants only where there are competing reasonable interpretations of an
ambiguous statutory provision and that, consequently, that interpretive doctrine
cannot, by definition, be applied to lead to a statutory interpretation that produces
an absurd result . . . because such and interpretation would be inherently not
“reasonable.”
Id.
261. See Pelegrini v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 112, 128 (2004) (Ivers, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting, but not exploring, the conflict between the requirements of
Chevron and Gardner).
262. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 865
(1984).
263. Id. at 842–43.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 843–44.
266. Interestingly, the opinion was later withdrawn from the bound volume at the court’s
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In 2004, the Veterans Court again explored and tried to resolve the
conflict. In Debeaord v. Principi,267 a veteran challenged the VA’s denial
of his request for an increased disability rating for vision impairment.268
The veteran had severe vision impairment in one eye that was serviceconnected and less severe vision impairment in the other eye that was not
service-connected.269 A statute allowed “a veteran [who] has suffered . . .
blindness in one eye as a result of service-connected disability and
blindness in the other eye as a result of non-service-connected disability” to
recover benefits as if each injury were service-connected.270 The statute
did not define “blindness.”271 Although the VA had a “‘confusing tapestry’
of regulations” defining blindness for other purposes,272 none of these
regulations specifically defined “blindness” for the statute at issue.273 To
resolve the statute’s meaning, the court turned to other definitions of
“blindness” in related statutes.274 After doing so, the court rejected the
veteran’s interpretation because the court believed that the veteran’s broad
definition “would result in compensating a veteran for a non-serviceconnected degree of impaired vision at a rate higher than if the same degree
of vision impairment had resulted from service.”275 In other words, the
court found the veteran’s interpretation to be absurd. In this case, the
veteran-litigant’s interpretation would benefit him, but it would harm other
veterans. Balancing these competing interests is the VA’s role.276

request after the parties moved jointly for full panel reconsideration due to newly discovered
legislative and regulatory history. Jordan v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 261, 265 (2003).
Further, the parties jointly asked the court to invalidate one of the regulations at issue. Id.
The parties reargued the case; after rehearing, the court again rejected the veteran’s statutory
interpretation claims because the VA was required to apply the regulation that existed at the
time the events occurred, even though the regulation was subsequently changed. Id. at 273–
74. In the later opinion, the majority made no mention of the conflict. However, by
separate opinion, Judge Steinberg, who authored the first, withdrawn opinion, reiterated the
distinction, namely that Gardner’s Presumption “is more aptly stated as prescribing that
interpretative doubt must be resolved in favor of the claimant where there are competing
reasonable interpretations of an ambiguous statutory provision.” Id. at 280 (Steinberg, J.,
writing separately). Nothing more was said.
267. 18 Vet. App. 357 (2004).
268. Id. at 359.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 363 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1160(a)(1) (2000)).
271. Id. at 363.
272. Id. at 366.
273. Id. at 367.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 366.
276. See generally DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VETERANS BENEFITS
ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL BENEFITS REPORT FISCAL YEAR (2010), available at
http://www.vba.va.gov/REPORTS/abr/2010_abr.pdf (“The mission of the Veterans Benefits
Administration (VBA), in partnership with the Veterans Health Administration and the
National Cemetery Administration, is to provide benefits and services to Veterans and their
families in a responsive, timely, and compassionate manner in recognition of their service to
the Nation.”).
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Ultimately, the court did not specifically define “blindness.”277 Instead,
the court concluded that the statute was not sufficiently ambiguous to
require the court “to address the appellant’s argument that any ambiguity in
[the statute] should be resolved in his favor . . . or to consider the
application of the doctrine of Gardner . . . .”278 Additionally, the court
noted that Chevron did not apply because there were no interpretive
regulations.279 Despite concluding that neither Gardner’s Presumption nor
Chevron applied, the court discussed the conflict anyway and muddled the
analysis further, stating:
If we had been required to deal with an ambiguous statutory scheme,
however, it is not altogether clear that we would have to abandon the
directive of the Supreme Court in Gardner, that “interpretive doubt is to
be resolved in the veteran’s favor,” a directive derived from King v. St.
Vincent’s Hospital, . . . a case issued seven years after Chevron, that
applied that interpretive principle to “read [a regulation] in [the
veteran’s] favor,” and that drew that principle from Fishgold v. Sullivan
Drydock & Repair Corp., . . . a case decided long before Chevron . . . .
Not only was that canon confirmed by the Supreme Court in Gardner ten
years after Chevron, but it is one tailored specifically to veterans’
benefits statutes as contrasted with the more general statutory
construction principle set forth in Chevron . . . . In the last analysis,
guidance from the Supreme Court would appear necessary to resolve this
matter definitively.280

The court’s analysis is incorrect in several ways. First, Debeaord did not
actually involve a conflict between Chevron and Gardner’s Presumption.
Because there was no regulation interpreting the statute at issue, Chevron
simply did not apply.281 Because there was no conflict, the court should
not have addressed the issue; therefore, this language is dictum at best.
Second, the Veterans Court found it relevant that the Supreme Court
created Gardner’s Presumption in a case resolved before the Court decided
Chevron—in Fishgold282—and then reaffirmed the existence of the
Presumption in a case decided after the Court decided Chevron—in
King.283 King’s reaffirmation of Fishgold, the court concluded, meant that
Gardner’s Presumption should prevail over Chevron whenever there is
277. Debeaord v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 357, 368 (2004).
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. (modification in original).
281. See supra Part II.C (explaining Chevron deference and its limits). Whether the
analysis from Skidmore v. Swift, Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) should have applied is another
question, one beyond the scope of this article. See generally Jellum, Chevron’s Step Zero,
supra note 189 at 85–86 (2011) (exploring when Chevron deference rather than Skidmore
deference is appropriate in the context of veteran’s jurisprudence).
282. 328 U.S. 275 (1946).
283. 502 U.S. 215 (1991).
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conflict.284 Yet, this conclusion is based on an incomplete analysis of the
underlying cases.
Neither King nor Fishgold involved agency
interpretations of statutes; hence, Chevron would not have applied in either
of those cases. Whether Chevron was decided before or after those cases
were decided is thus completely irrelevant to the resolution of the conflict
between Chevron and Gardner. It is possible that in cases in which a court
interprets a statute without the aid of an agency interpretation, Gardner
should apply and that in cases in which a court interprets a statute with the
aid of an agency interpretation, Chevron should apply.285 Simply put, the
timing of the cases, without more, tells us nothing because the Supreme
Court did not address the issue.
Finally, the Veterans Court finished its analysis in Debeaord by noting
that specific statutory provisions control general statutory provisions when
there is a conflict.286 This principle is indeed accurate. Yet, the court
implies that this principle resolves the conflict between Gardner’s
Presumption and Chevron.
The court suggests that Gardner’s
Presumption, a specific interpretive canon, should control over Chevron, a
general interpretive canon, when there is conflict because of the specificgeneral canon of interpretation.287 But this specific-general canon is an
interpretive method for resolving conflicting statutes; it is not an
interpretive method for resolving conflicting canons of interpretation and,
to my knowledge, has never before been used as such.288 Further, it should
not be used as such because the specific-general canon is based on
legislative behavior rather than judicial behavior.289 The canon presumes
that legislatures are aware of all existing statutes when they enact new
statutes and that legislatures would expect a specific statute to apply over a
conflicting, general one.290 Thus, the specific-general canon cannot resolve
the conflict between Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron, and the court’s
reliance on it was misplaced. Perhaps the most persuasive point in the
court’s analysis is its parting comment—that the Supreme Court should
“resolve this matter definitively.”291
Two years later, in 2006, the Veterans Court tried again to resolve the
conflict, this time suggesting that Chevron should trump Gardner’s
Presumption. In Haas v. Nicholson,292 the court addressed whether a
284. DeBeaord, 18 Vet. App. at 368 (2004).
285. See infra Parts V.C & V.D (discussing cases in which the court has come out on
either side of this debate).
286. DeBeaord v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 357, 368 (2004).
287. Id.
288. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 59, at 140–44.
289. Id. at 141.
290. Id.
291. Debeaord, 18 Vet. App. at 368.
292. 20 Vet. App. 257 (2006), rev’d sub nom. Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir.
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veteran who served on a ship that traveled near the coastal waters of
Vietnam but who never went ashore “served in the Republic of
Vietnam.”293 A statute presumed that any veteran who “served in the
Republic of Vietnam” during specified time periods was exposed to Agent
Orange.294 The VA promulgated a regulation interpreting this statutory
phrase to apply only to those service members whose service involved
“duty or visitation” in Vietnam.295 The VA then interpreted the phrase
“duty or visitation” in its regulation to apply only to veterans who had
physically set foot in Vietnam, even if only for a short time.296 Because
Haas had served on a ship that was located near Vietnam but had never
actually set foot in the country, the VA denied his claim for benefits.297
Haas appealed, and the Veterans Court reversed.298 In its reasoning, the
court looked first to the statute, acknowledging that it was ambiguous.299
The court then turned to Chevron.300 Before applying Chevron, however,
the court pointed out in a footnote that Gardner’s Presumption did not
apply because Chevron did:
It is noteworthy that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v.
Gardner . . . does not appear to apply in this instance. In Terry v.
Principi, the [Federal Circuit] observed that the principle enunciated in
Brown is “a canon of statutory construction that requires that resolution
of interpretive doubt arising from statutory language be resolved in favor
of the veteran . . . .” The Federal Circuit then concluded that the canon
“does not affect the determination of whether an agency’s regulation is a
permissible construction of a statute.”301

The court said nothing more about Gardner and Chevron. Instead, the
court found the regulation ambiguous and turned to evaluate the VA’s
interpretation of its regulation—that “duty or visitation” meant a veteran
must have actually stepped onto the land.302 The court then rejected the
VA’s interpretation of its own regulation.303 In doing so, the court
2008).
293. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. at 263 (quoting 38 U.S.C. 1116(f) (2000)).
294. Id.
295. Id. at 269 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii) (2006)).
296. Id. at 267.
297. Id. at 259.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 269. Notably, Chevron is not the appropriate deference standard when an
agency interprets its own regulation; Auer is.
JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION, supra note 59, at 227. Although it is possible that because the regulation
merely parroted the statute, neither Chevron nor Auer applied pursuant to Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
301. 20 Vet. App. at 269 n.4.
302. Id. at 269.
303. Id. An agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is respected unless it is plainly
wrong. See Kerr, supra note 84. It is hard to see how the VA’s interpretation of this
regulation could have been plainly wrong. The term “duty or visitation” is at least
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substituted its own interpretation rather than determine that the VA’s
interpretation was “plainly erroneous.”304 The case was reversed on appeal
for this reason.305
In 2007, in Sursely v. Peake,306 the Veterans Court again noted the
conflict between Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron, but did not try to
resolve the conflict. In this case, the court affirmed a VA decision that
refused a veteran’s request for two separate clothing allowances.307 The
relevant statute authorized clothing allowances for disabled veterans who
use a prosthetic or orthopedic appliance that tends to wear out or tear
clothing.308 Because the veteran had two separate disabilities, he had
requested two separate clothing allowances.309 The VA denied the second
claim because the relevant statute used the singular: “shall pay a clothing
allowance of $662 per year . . . .”310 The Veterans Court affirmed the
denial, finding the statutory language clear.311 The court did not initially
mention Gardner’s Presumption because it found the statute
unambiguous.312 However, the court later turned its attention to an
interpreting regulation to determine whether Gardner’s Presumption
applied.313 The court discussed, but did not resolve, the conflict between
Chevron’s second step and Gardner’s Presumption:314
The Federal Circuit has discussed the relationship between Brown and
the second part of the Chevron analysis, cautioning that “a veteran
‘cannot rely upon the generous spirit that suffuses the law generally to
override the clear meaning of a particular provision,’” that “where the
meaning of a statutory provision is ambiguous, [the Court] must take
care not to invalidate otherwise reasonable agency regulations simply
because they do not provide for a pro-claimant outcome in every
imaginable case,” and that “[w]here a statute is ambiguous and the
ambiguous regarding whether a veteran had to step onto Vietnamese soil; indeed, requiring
the veteran to actually step onto the land seems reasonable. Because the VA’s interpretation
was not plainly wrong, the Veterans Court should have upheld the regulation. Instead, the
court rejected this interpretation because it was “inconsistent” with precedent, was “plainly
erroneous” pursuant to the legislative history, and was an “unreasonable” interpretation of
the regulations. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. at 270.
304. Id.
305. Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
306. 22 Vet. App. 21 (2007), rev’d, 551 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
307. Id. at 27–28.
308. Id. at 23.
309. Id.
310. Id. (referring to 38 U.S.C. § 1162 (2006) (emphasis added)).
311. Id. at 22 (“The statutory language . . . clearly provides only one clothing allowance
per eligible veteran . . . ”).
312. Id. at 26.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 26. In so doing, the court referred to the Federal Circuit’s decisions in
Disabled American Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 682, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2000), Boyer v. West,
210 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2000), and Sears v. Principi, 349 F.3d 1326, 1331–32 (Fed.
Cir. 2003), discussed supra in Part IV.
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administering agency has issued a reasonable gap-filling or ambiguityresolving regulation, [the Court] must uphold that regulation.”315

After describing the Federal Circuit’s concerns, the court found that the
regulation and statute were clear and therefore, “[there was] no reason to
apply [Gardner’s Presumption] in this instance.”316
On appeal, the Federal Circuit disagreed and reversed.317 Finding that
the regulation merely parroted the statute, the court refused to apply
Chevron.318 Instead, the court found that the legislative history and
Gardner’s Presumption were dispositive.319 Thus, in Sursely the Federal
Circuit found Gardner’s Presumption (and the legislative history) to be
dispositive,320 while the Veterans Court did not apply Gardner’s
Presumption because the statute was clear.321 In short, the jurisprudence of
the two courts was at odds.
B. The Federal Circuit Explores the Conflict
The Federal Circuit first noted the possible conflict in 2000,322 two years
earlier than the Veterans Court. The following year, the Federal Circuit
suggested that Gardner’s Presumption did not apply in cases involving
Chevron.323 At one time, the court suggested in dictum that Gardner’s
Presumption was merely a canon of last resort when all other avenues for
resolving ambiguity, including Chevron, fail.324 After struggling with the
conflict for a number of years, in 2011 the court returned to its original
position that Chevron trumped Gardner. Gardner’s Presumption had
fallen from grace.
The first case in which the Federal Circuit addressed this issue of the
interplay between Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron was Boyer v.
West.325 In that case, the veteran raised the conflict by arguing that
315. Sursely, 22 Vet. App. at 26 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
316. Id. at 27.
317. Sursely v. Peake, 551 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
318. Id. at 1355. (“The regulation uses the word ‘the’ rather than the statute’s ‘a’ in
reference to the term ‘clothing allowance.’ Changing articles from ‘a’ to ‘the’ does nothing
to resolve the question at issue, and does not reflect a deliberate effort to interpret the
statute’s meaning.”). The court correctly refused to apply Chevron deference to an agency’s
interpretation of a parroting regulation pursuant to the Supreme Court’s holding in Gonzales
v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
319. Sursely, 551 F.3d at 1357 (referencing both Congressional intent and Gardner in
holding in the veteran’s favor).
320. Id.
321. Sursely v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 21, 22 (2007), rev’d, 551 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
322. Boyer v. West, 210 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
323. Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d
1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
324. Terri v. Principi, 340 F.3d 1378, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
325. 210 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In this case, a veteran challenged the VA’s refusal
to consider the hearing loss in his right ear when evaluating whether he had service-
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Gardner’s Presumption always trumped Chevron.326 However, the veteran
was ill-advised to make this argument because Chevron was inapplicable;
there was no regulation interpreting the statutory provision.327 Although
Chevron did not apply, the Federal Circuit responded to the veteran’s
argument anyway, stating that Gardner’s Presumption did not apply when
the statute was clear.328 Here, the court concluded that the statute was clear
and that the VA’s interpretation was consistent with the unambiguous
language.329 The court then cautioned veterans not to “rely upon the
generous spirit that suffuses the law generally to override the clear meaning
of a particular provision.”330 Because Chevron did not apply and because
the language of the statute was clear, the court had no reason to respond
further to the veteran’s argument that Gardner’s Presumption always
trumped Chevron.
A short time later, however, the Federal Circuit addressed the conflict
more directly. In Disabled American Veterans v. Gober,331 the statute at
issue allowed veterans to challenge existing VA decisions for “clear and
unmistakable error.”332 The VA had issued regulations interpreting this
language; thus, Chevron applied.333 Noting the conflict between Gardner’s
Presumption and Chevron, the court cautioned litigants that while
Gardner’s Presumption may alter the analysis, it does not trump
Chevron.334 Thus, the court recognized that the two doctrines were in
tension, but the court was unaware of, or at least did not articulate, the
extent of this tension. In any event, the court had no need to resolve the
conflict because the issue on appeal involved a procedural challenge rather
than an interpretive challenge.335 Thus, the court offered no further
connected hearing loss in his left ear. Id. at 1352.
326. Id. at 1354.
327. Id. at 1354–55 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 4.85(f) (2000)). Although the VA subsequently
codified its interpretation. Id.
328. See id. at 1355 (citations omitted) (recognizing that Gardner’s Presumption applies
when a court finds ambiguity in a veterans’ benefits statute).
329. Id. at 1352.
330. Id. at 1355.
331. 234 F.3d 682 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
332. Id. at 695.
333. Id. at 686. Several veterans groups challenged the regulations on procedural and
interpretive grounds. Id.
334. Id. at 692. Specifically, the court said:
Chevron deference applies if Congress is either silent or unclear on a particular
issue. However, modifying the traditional Chevron analysis is the doctrine
governing the interpretation of ambiguities in veterans’ benefit statutes—that
“interpretative doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.” Yet, “[a]t the same
time, we have also recognized that a veteran ‘cannot rely upon the generous spirit
that suffuses the law generally to override the clear meaning of a particular
provision.’”
Id. at 691–92 (citations omitted).
335. Id. at 692. The veteran argued that the VA acted arbitrarily and capriciously by
failing to provide an adequate statement of the basis and purpose for the rules at issue and
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guidance on how Gardner modified Chevron.
One year later, in 2001, the Federal Circuit referred to the conflict yet
again in dictum, this time suggesting that Gardner’s Presumption might be
a part of Chevron’s first step. In National Organization of Veterans’
Advocates, Inc. v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs,336 the statute at issue
provided that specific benefits would be awarded to veterans “who
[were] . . . entitled to receive . . . compensation at the time of death . . . .”337
The court concluded that the phrase “entitled to receive” was ambiguous
because the legislative history suggested one interpretation while
Gardner’s Presumption suggested another.338 The court noted that “it is a
well-established rule of statutory construction that when a statute is
ambiguous, ‘interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.’”339
Chevron was not an issue in this case because the interpreting regulation
was not issued through notice and comment procedures.340 Despite this
fact, the court noted that if Chevron applied, the next step in the court’s
analysis would be to apply Chevron because the traditional tools of
statutory interpretation pointed in opposite directions.341 In saying that
Chevron—meaning Chevron’s second step—would be the next step, the
court suggested that Gardner’s Presumption should be part of Chevron’s
first step. In other words, the court seemed to be suggesting that if
Gardner’s Presumption were to resolve any ambiguity at Chevron’s first
step, then Chevron’s second step would be unnecessary. Ultimately, the
court remanded National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. on
other grounds.342
In 2003, the Federal Circuit addressed the conflict head on.343 In Sears
that the VA did not respond adequately to comments submitted during the rulemaking
process. Id.
336. 260 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
337. Id. at 1377 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1318(b) (Supp. V 1999)).
338. Id. at 1377–78. The court noted that the canons of interpretation for resolving that
ambiguity pointed in different directions. Specifically, the legislative history was relatively
clear that the VA’s interpretation was correct. Id. at 1377.
339. Id. at 1378 (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)). Thus, although
one of the traditional tools of interpretation (legislative history) directly supported the VA’s
interpretative regulation, the Federal Circuit essentially ignored that history pursuant to
Gardner’s Presumption simply because the interpretation was less favorable to the veteran.
Id.
340. Id. at 1378 (stating imprecisely “[w]hile the parties do not argue the point, the
Supreme Court has held that Chevron deference does not normally apply to informal
rulemakings.”).
341. Id. at 1378–79.
342. Id. at 1380–81 (remanding for the VA to reconcile an inconsistency between the
regulation at issue and another VA regulation).
343. In 2003, the Federal Circuit also briefly mentioned both doctrines in National
Organization of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 330 F.3d 1345,
1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Note that this case has the same name as National Organization of
Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
However, the cases are unrelated. In the 2003 case, the court failed to acknowledge, let
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v. Principi,344 the court soundly rejected the veteran’s argument that
“ambiguity must always be resolved in favor of the veteran because the
pro-claimant policy underlying the veterans’ benefits scheme overrides
Chevron deference.”345 At issue was a VA regulation that established an
effective date for a veteran’s post traumatic stress disorder claim.346 The
statute provided that the effective date of such a claim “shall not be earlier
than the date of receipt of application therefor.”347 The VA had issued a
regulation interpreting this language such that the effective date for
reopening a claim was the “[d]ate of receipt of new claim or date
entitlement arose, whichever [was] later.”348 Thus, the VA interpreted the
relevant statute to permit the earliest effective date of a reopened claim to
be the date of the application for reopening rather than the date of the
original denial; that interpretation in this case caused the veteran to lose
five years’ worth of benefits.349
On appeal, the veteran argued that the regulation was inconsistent with
the statutory language and, alternatively, that the regulation was
inconsistent with “the pro-claimant policy permeating Title 38.”350 The
court applied Chevron, finding first that the statutory language was
ambiguous and finding second that the VA’s interpretation was
reasonable.351
Turning to the veteran’s alternative argument—that
Gardner’s Presumption always trumps Chevron—the court said that
“[e]ven where the meaning of a statutory provision is ambiguous, we must
take care not to invalidate otherwise reasonable agency regulations simply
because they do not provide for a pro-claimant outcome in every
imaginable case.”352 Indeed, the court noted that neither it nor the veteran
alone resolve, any conflict. Instead, the court said simply:
The first inquiry under 5 U.S.C. § 706, in which we interpret the meaning of
relevant statutes, is governed by the standards established by the Supreme Court in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 . . . .
Thus, Chevron deference applies if Congress is either silent or ambiguous on a
particular issue. However, when interpreting statutes relating to veterans,
“interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.”
330 F.3d at 1349–50 (quoting 260 F.3d at 1378).
Although the court identified both doctrines, the court did not acknowledge that the two
conflicted. Moreover, the court neither applied nor mentioned Chevron nor Gardner again
in the remainder of the opinion. Id. at 1350–52. The court did note that the VA had argued
that its regulation was entitled to Chevron deference, but the court itself did not apply the
Chevron two-step analysis. Id. at 1350. Instead, the court said simply that the VA’s
regulations were consistent with the statute and were, therefore, valid. Id. at 1352.
344. 349 F.3d 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
345. Id. at 1331.
346. Id. at 1329.
347. Id. at 1328 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 5110(a) (2000)).
348. Id. at 1328 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(q)(1)(ii) (2003)).
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 1330.
352. Id. at 1331–32.
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could identify “a single case in which this court has invalidated a regulation
that would otherwise be entitled to Chevron deference on this ground.”353
Thus, in this case, Gardner’s Presumption lost to Chevron; however, the
Federal Circuit did not explain specifically how to resolve the conflict.
Rather, Gardner’s Presumption simply played no role in the court’s
reasoning. Perhaps the court believed that Gardner’s Presumption simply
has no role in cases in which Chevron applies,354 but if so, the court could
have stated so more clearly.
Later that same year, the Federal Circuit clarified that Gardner’s
Presumption did not apply in cases in which Chevron applied. In Terry v.
Principi,355 the veteran sought compensation for an eye condition that the
VA had excluded from coverage.356 The relevant statute provided that only
those disabilities attributable to an “injury” or a “disease” incurred or
aggravated “in [the] line of duty” were compensable.357 The VA by
regulation had excluded certain conditions, including “refractive error of
the eye,” from the terms “injury” and “disease.”358 Thus, the VA denied
the claim, and the veteran appealed.359 On appeal, the Federal Circuit
applied Chevron, holding that the statute was ambiguous and the VA’s
interpretation was a reasonable interpretation of that ambiguous
language.360 The court then soundly rejected the veteran’s argument that
“an otherwise reasonable interpretation of a statute by the VA is
impermissible if the statute is not liberally construed in favor of the veteran
[pursuant to Gardner’s Presumption].”361 Directly addressing the conflict,
the court stated that Gardner’s Presumption “does not affect the
determination of whether an agency’s regulation is a permissible
construction of a statute.”362 In other words, Gardner’s Presumption
simply does not apply when Chevron does.
Seven years later, in 2010, the Federal Circuit contradicted itself when it
again addressed the conflict in dictum. This time the court suggested that
Gardner’s Presumption might apply in a case involving Chevron, but that
Gardner’s Presumption should be used only as a canon of last resort.
Specifically, in Nielson v. Shinseki,363 the veteran lost almost all his teeth as

353. Id. at 1332.
354. See infra Part V.E.
355. 340 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
356. Id. at 1380.
357. Id. at 1382 (quoting 38 U.S.C. §§ 1110, 1131 (2000)).
358. Id. at 1383 (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(c) (2003)).
359. Id. at 1381.
360. Id. at 1383–84.
361. Id. at 1384.
362. Id. (citing Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260
F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
363. 607 F.3d 802 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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a result of a severe periodontal infection while in the service.364 The VA
granted him service connection for the loss of teeth,365 but denied his
request for dentures pursuant to a statute that provided veterans with
“outpatient dental care and related dental appliances” for service-connected
wounds or “‘other service trauma.’”366 The issue for the court was whether
dental treatment could be considered a “service trauma.”367 The VA
rejected this interpretation, stating that “‘service trauma’ does not include
the intended result of proper medical treatment provided by the military.”368
Because the VA had not interpreted this language by regulation, Chevron
did not apply.369 Nonetheless, the court addressed the conflict between
Chevron and Gardner’s Presumption because the veteran had argued that
Gardner’s Presumption should be the first place for a court to turn in the
face of statutory ambiguity.370 The Federal Circuit in dictum rejected this
argument: “The mere fact that the particular words of the statute—that is,
“service trauma”—standing alone might be ambiguous does not compel us
to resort to [Gardner’s Presumption]. Rather, that canon is only applicable
after other interpretive guidelines have been exhausted, including
Chevron.”371 In other words, Gardner’s Presumption applies only when a
statute remains ambiguous after other common interpretive canons have
been applied and other sources of meaning have been searched, including
Chevron’s second step.372
This approach is simply wrong. If the dictum in Nielson were correct,
then the only time Gardner’s Presumption would apply in a Chevron case

364. Id. at 804.
365. Id.
366. Id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1712(a)(1)(C)).
367. Id.
368. Id. at 805.
369. See id. (applying a tool of statutory interpretation to give undefined words their
ordinary meaning).
370. See id. at 808.
371. Id. The court cited to a number of its prior precedents as support for its assertion.
See id. at n.4
372. Similarly, the dissenting judges in Carpenter v. Principi used this last-resort
approach. 15 Vet. App. 64, 88–89 (2001). Whereas the majority viewed the presumption as
a canon of first resort, the dissenting judges viewed the presumption as a canon of last
resort. Id. Both dissenting judges proposed that before the court should resort to the
presumption, other potential sources of meaning, such as legislative history, should be
examined. For example, Judge Steinberg argued that “it is incumbent on the Court to
explore both the legislative history as well as the caselaw . . .” before rendering an
interpretation. Id. at 91 (Steinberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Similarly,
Chief Judge Kramer complained that “the majority makes [its] holding, ostensibly based on
the veterans benefits precept that any interpretive doubt as to the meaning of the statute . . .
must be resolved in favor of the veteran, without discussing pertinent legislative history.”
Id. at 94 (Kramer, C.J., dissenting). Hence, the dissenting judges viewed Gardner’s
Presumption as a canon to apply when the traditional tools of statutory interpretation fail to
resolve ambiguity. Only when other avenues of meaning fail should any remaining
interpretive doubt be resolved in the veteran’s favor.
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would be when the VA interpreted the statute in an unreasonable manner,
because if the VA interpreted the statute in a reasonable manner, then no
ambiguity would remain. Admittedly, such an approach would greatly
lessen the conflict between Chevron’s second step and Gardner’s
Presumption for fewer statutes would be ambiguous if other avenues were
first explored. However, such an approach would eviscerate Gardner’s
Presumption as it would be rare that the other tools of construction,
especially Chevron’s second step, would not have resolved the ambiguity.
Gardner’s Presumption, as originally formulated, furthers the important
policies of rewarding veterans for their service and helping them return to
civilian life; hence, eviscerating Gardner’s Presumption is not an ideal
solution. Moreover, with this dictum, the court ignored its earlier
suggestion from both Terry and Sears that Gardner’s Presumption does not
apply in cases involving Chevron.373
In sum, the Federal Circuit has approached the Chevron/Gardner
conflict somewhat inconsistently. For this court, Gardner’s Presumption
has morphed from a veteran’s ace in the hole, to a canon of last resort, to a
doctrine effectively ignored. In the court’s most recent case to address this
issue, Guerra v. Shinseki,374 the majority returned to its position from Terry
and Sears—that Chevron’s second step trumped Gardner’s Presumption.
In Guerra, the majority made clear that Gardner’s Presumption yields to
Chevron,375 while the dissent believed that Chevron yields to Gardner’s
Presumption.376 So, which understanding is correct? Should Gardner’s
Presumption replace Chevron’s second step, become a canon of last resort
applied only when the VA’s interpretation is unreasonable, or have no
application in Chevron cases? The next section offers various ways to
resolve this conflict.
V. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
This section identifies and explores ways to resolve the conflict between
Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron. In sum, Gardner’s Presumption
must be returned to its original form: a directive to liberally construe
veterans’ benefits statutes. In its current super-strong form, it should play
no role in cases involving VA interpretations entitled to Chevron deference
373. See Terry v. Principi, 340 F.3d 1378, 1382–83 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (choosing to apply
Chevron rather than Gardner’s Presumption); Sears v. Principi, 349 F.3d 1326, 1331–32
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (applying the Chevron approach).
374. 642 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The facts and reasoning of this case are detailed in
infra Part V.C.3.
375. 642 F.3d at 1051 (rejecting the argument that Gardner’s Presumption overrides
Chevron deference).
376. See id. at 1052–54 (Gajarsa, C.J., dissenting) (claiming that the majority should
have turned to Gardner’s Presumption rather than Chevron’s second step after finding the
statute ambiguous).
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because these two interpretive canons are irreconcilable.377 In contrast, as a
liberal construction canon, Gardner’s Presumption could be relevant at
Chevron’s first step, as are other liberal construction canons. However it is
formulated, Gardner’s Presumption is never relevant during Chevron’s
second step because at this point the VA’s reasonable interpretation is
entitled to respect. Additionally, in those cases in which the VA’s
interpretation is not entitled to Chevron deference, Gardner’s Presumption
might play a role as a valid tie-breaker—a presumption that rewards
veterans for their sacrifice and helps them assimilate back into society.
Finally, and most promisingly, Gardner’s Presumption might be viewed as
a duty belonging to the VA rather than as an interpretive tool belonging to
courts; however, only one court in one instance has explicitly applied this
approach. The next section explores these possible solutions.
A. Gardner’s Presumption Should Re-morph
Regardless of any other changes made to Gardner’s Presumption, courts
should transform the Presumption back to the liberal construction canon of
its youth. A liberal construction canon is sufficiently veteran-friendly,
without being overly veteran-friendly, to accommodate competing
interests. Moreover, such an approach would allow the VA to consider the
best approach for veterans as a whole rather than allowing one particular
veteran to highjack the interpretive process.
When the Supreme Court first created and applied what I have called
Gardner’s Presumption in Boone, the Court simply applied the familiar
interpretive canon that remedial statutes should be construed liberally.378
This formulation of Gardner’s Presumption (Boone’s interpretive canon)
made sense: when a statute was ambiguous, putting the veterans’ interests
above private individuals’ interests and above governmental interests
rewarded veterans for their service to this country and helped them
assimilate back into society.379 Then, the Supreme Court in King
transformed Boone’s interpretive canon from a simple directive to courts to
construe veterans’ statutes liberally into a terse directive to courts to
construe such statutes in favor of veterans.380 That change was neither
explained nor necessary.
Notably, the Supreme Court developed
Gardner’s Presumption into its super-strong formulation in King and then
applied that formulation to cases involving VA interpretations in Gardner
377. See Jellum, Chevron’s Step Zero, supra note 189 at 84–85 (2011) (explaining when
Chevron rather than Skidmore deference is the appropriate standard for courts to use to
review VA interpretations of statutes).
378. See Boone, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943) (construing the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil
Relief Act liberally to favor those who have sacrificed to serve the nation).
379. See cases cited supra note 60 and accompanying text.
380. King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220–21 (1991).
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shortly after VA decisions first became subject to judicial review.381 The
Court may have transformed the Presumption as a way to encourage the
VA to act in a veteran-friendly way or to encourage the new Veterans
Court to err on the side of the veteran when interpreting veterans’ benefits
statutes. If accurate, the super-strong rendition of Gardner’s Presumption
could be viewed as serving a transitional function—a function that should
no longer be necessary now that judicial review of VA decisions is more
than twenty-five years old.
Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence shows that the Court strongly
supports a liberal approach to interpreting veterans’ statutes generally.
Illustratively, in Henderson the Court broadly interpreted a procedural
statute.382 The statute at issue gave a veteran 120 days to appeal a VA
decision to the Veterans Court.383 The veteran filed fifteen days late.384
The Veterans Court and the Federal Circuit had both interpreted the statute
strictly and dismissed the claim pursuant to an earlier Supreme Court case
that held that such statutes were jurisdictional and thus, should be strictly
construed.385 The Supreme Court reversed and said that this statute was not
jurisdictional.386 In doing so, the Court stressed that the uniqueness of
veterans law cautioned against strict interpretations in general.387
Specifically, the Court mentioned that “Congress’ longstanding solicitude
for veterans is plainly reflected in the [Veterans’ Judicial Review Act] and
in subsequent laws that ‘place a thumb on the scale in the veteran’s favor in
the course of administrative and judicial review of VA decisions . . . .’”388
Additionally, the Court mentioned Gardner’s Presumption, noting that
“[w]e have long applied ‘the canon that provisions for benefits to members
of the Armed Services are to be construed in the beneficiaries’ favor.’”389
With this language, the Court once again noted that veterans’ statutes
should be broadly interpreted owing to the pro-claimant, veteran-friendly
nature of veterans law.390 However, while the Supreme Court continues to
quote Gardner’s Presumption in its super-strong formulation, the Court’s

381. See Ridgway, supra note 20 (discussing the development of judicial review in the
VA system).
382. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1198 (2011).
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id. (citing Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007)).
386. Id. at 1206.
387. See id. at 1199 (explaining differences between civil litigation and administrative
litigation in veterans court).
388. Id. at 1199 (citations omitted).
389. Id. at 1206 (quoting King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 220–21 n.9 (1991)).
390. Id. In another case, the Court mentioned that “Congress’ special solicitude for
veterans might lead a reviewing court to consider harmful in a veteran’s case error that it
might consider harmless in other cases . . . .” Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 1700
(2009) (finding against the veteran).
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rhetoric would also support the Presumption being returned to a liberal
construction canon.
Another reason to transform Gardner’s Presumption back into a liberal
construction canon is that the current formation is difficult to apply. For
example, exactly how favorable to veterans must an interpretation be to
survive analysis under Gardner’s Presumption? The Federal Circuit raised
this concern in Haas v. Peake.391 As noted earlier, the issue for the court in
that case was whether a veteran who served on a ship that traveled near
Vietnam but who never went ashore “served in the Republic of
Vietnam.”392 The VA had promulgated a regulation interpreting this phrase
to apply only to those veterans whose service involved “duty or visitation”
in Vietnam.393 The VA then interpreted the phrase “duty or visitation” in
the regulation to apply only to veterans who had physically set foot in
Vietnam, even if only for a short time.394 The veteran had appealed the
VA’s decision and lost.395
Before the Federal Circuit in a petition for rehearing, the veteran argued
that the Veterans Court should have applied Gardner’s Presumption.396
The Federal Circuit disagreed. In holding that the veteran had waived the
argument that Gardner’s Presumption applied by not raising the issue in his
original appeal, the court noted one difficulty of applying the Presumption:
“this case would present a practical difficulty in determining what it means
for an interpretation to be ‘pro-claimant.’”397 Specifically, the VA had
already interpreted the statute in a pro-veteran manner by applying the
language to any veteran who had set foot on land, for however long.398
Haas wanted an even more pro-veteran interpretation, one that favored
him.399
Veteran-litigants are likely to suggest that an interpretation is sufficiently
veteran-friendly only when it would allow them to win their cases. Yet,
such an answer potentially pits the veteran-litigant against all other
veterans. Whenever a veteran is in danger of losing benefits under the
VA’s interpretation of a statute, that veteran will allege that the VA’s
interpretation is not veteran-friendly enough. Unless the veteran’s
alternative interpretation is absurd, the courts’ current articulation of
Gardner’s Presumption suggests that the veteran must win.400 If instead,
391.
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

544 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (per curiam).
Id. at 1307–08.
Id. at 1308 (citing 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a)(6)(iii)).
Id. at 1308–09.
Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168, 1168–69 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
Haas, 544 F.3d at 1308.
Id. at 1308–09.
Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1308.
See, e.g., Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1199 (2011) (describing the
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Gardner’s Presumption simply required that veterans’ benefits statutes be
liberally construed, then balance could be restored and veterans’ interests
as a group could be considered. Admittedly, a liberal-construction
approach may raise similar concerns: how liberal must the interpretation
be to survive a challenge? However, the change to a liberal construction
canon would be an improvement because, as currently formulated,
Gardner’s Presumption directs that only one interpretation is correct—the
most veteran-friendly interpretation. Whereas reformulated, Gardner’s
Presumption would allow more than one interpretation to be acceptable.
Veterans’ benefits statutes should be construed liberally, as all remedial
statutes should. Thus, Gardner’s Presumption should be returned to its
humble beginnings when Boone’s interpretive canon directed courts to
construe veterans’ benefits statutes liberally to protect those individuals
who dropped their own affairs to fight for our nation.401 Gardner’s
Presumption should re-morph to its original form.
B. Gardner’s Presumption Should Only Apply to Veterans’ Benefits
Statutes
Regardless of whether the courts return Gardner’s Presumption to its
liberal construction beginnings, Gardner’s application must be curtailed.
Courts should apply Gardner’s Presumption only when the statute is truly a
veterans’ benefits statute. Gardner’s Presumption is simply inappropriate
for resolving ambiguity in generally applicable statutes, because it makes
no sense to allow veterans to interpret statutes that apply outside of the
veterans’ arena. Such a limit already applies in the context of Chevron:
when an agency interprets a generally applicable statute, such as the tax
code or the Administrative Procedures Act, Chevron does not apply.402
This limitation has appeared in the Federal Circuit’s cases. For example,
the VA raised this issue during the appeal of Bazalo v. Brown.403 In that
case, the VA interpreted the EAJA,404 a generally applicable statute that
applies to litigants besides veterans.405 The issue in Bazalo was whether
the veteran had to submit proof of his net worth within a thirty-day filing
current preference in favor of the veteran in review of VA decisions).
401. Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943). Or, as Justice Douglas noted in a
later case, “[b]ut as we indicated on another occasion, the Act must be read with an eye
friendly to those who dropped their affairs to answer their country’s call.” Le Maistre v.
Leffers, 333 U.S. 1, 6 (1948).
402. See Jellum, Chevron’s Step Zero, supra note 189 at 84–85.
403. 9 Vet. App. 304 (1996), rev’d sub nom. Bazalo v. West, 150 F.3d 1380 (Fed. Cir.
1998). The EAJA allows parties, including veterans, to receive attorneys’ fees and expenses
when they prevail in litigation against the government, so long as they meet certain
requirements. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
404. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1991).
405. 9 Vet. App. at 308-09 (noting that the EAJA applies to the United States agencies
and officials).
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window.406 The Veterans Court held that the veteran could not supplement
the defective application after thirty days.407 In its reasoning, the majority
did not mention Gardner’s Presumption.408
When the veteran appealed the case to the Federal Circuit, the VA
argued, among other things, that Gardner’s Presumption did not apply
because the EAJA was not a veterans’ benefits statute; rather, it was a
generally applicable statute that applied to any party prevailing against the
government.409 Hence, the VA argued that the Presumption should not
apply. The majority dodged the issue entirely stating that, “[i]n making
this determination, we need not address whether the canon of construction
that interpretive doubt be resolved in favor of a veteran should be
applied.”410 In contrast to the majority, the dissent agreed with the VA:
“[t]he EAJA is not a veterans’ benefits statute, however. Rather, it is a
statute of general applicability. The rule of statutory construction upon
which [the veteran] relies does not apply in this case.”411 The dissent’s
approach is the correct one; Gardner’s Presumption should not apply to
generally applicable statutes.
In a more recent case, the Veterans Court applied this limitation. In
Ramsey v. Nicholson,412 the veteran sought mandamus to compel the VA to
hear his case. The VA Secretary had issued a memorandum staying a class
of pending cases because the VA was appealing an adverse decision from
the Veterans Court on the issue.413 The relevant statute directed the VA to
decide cases “in regular order according to [their] place upon the
docket.”414 The veteran argued that this language required the VA to
process cases in strict numerical order without granting any stays.415 The
court first rejected this narrow interpretation as absurd.416 The court then
acknowledged that Gardner’s Presumption was relevant “where a veterans’
benefits statute is ambiguous.” 417 But the court was not convinced that
“the statute in question [was] a veterans’ benefits statute rather than a
406. Id. at 306.
407. Id. at 311.
408. In contrast, the dissent referred to Gardner’s Presumption. Id. at 314–15
(Steinberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the majority opinion
“contradicts the Supreme Court’s recent charge that in construing a statute ‘interpretive
doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor.’” (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115,
118 (1994)).
409. Bazalo v. West, 150 F.3d. 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
410. Id. at 1383–84 n.1.
411. Id. at 1384 (Schall, C.J., dissenting).
412. 20 Vet. App. 16 (2006).
413. Id. at 20.
414. Id. at 29 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 7107(a) (2006)).
415. Id.
416. See id. at 31 (describing the problematic scenarios that result from the veteran’s
proposed literal interpretation of the statute).
417. Id. at 35.
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statute setting general guidance for fairness . . . .”418 The court therefore
concluded that Gardner’s Presumption did not apply.
Most recently, in Henderson v. Shinseki,419 the Federal Circuit failed to
mention Gardner’s Presumption in a case involving a statute that was not a
veterans’ benefits statute.420 While the statute at issue identified the time
for filing a notice of appeal with the Veterans Court and, thus, applied only
to veterans’ cases, the statute did not provide any benefits to veterans. The
issue for the Federal Circuit was whether the statute was subject to
equitable tolling.421 The court held that the statute could not be tolled but
never mentioned Gardner’s Presumption.422 Why the court failed to
mention Gardner’s Presumption is unclear, but it is possible that the court
ignored the Presumption because the statute at issue was not a veterans’
benefits statute. Notably, Chevron did not apply.
Candidly, the Supreme Court has ignored the distinction between a
veterans’ benefits statute and a veterans’ statute. The Court reversed the
Federal Circuit’s holding in Henderson and cited Gardner’s Presumption to
support its pro-veteran decision.423 The Court’s opinion suggests that it
applies Gardner’s Presumption to all veterans’ statutes regardless of
whether they are veterans’ benefits statutes. Perhaps the Court should
reconsider this conclusion, but at a minimum, Gardner’s Presumption
should not apply to generally applicable statutes like the EAJA.
Hence, even if Gardner’s Presumption is an appropriate canon for judges
to use when interpreting statutes, courts should not use the Presumption
when the statute at issue is not a veterans’ statute, such as one meant to
provide review of VA decisions. The Presumption is also inappropriate
when the statute is not a veterans benefit statute meant to thank and honor
veterans for their service. Certainly, veterans should play no role in
interpreting generally applicable statutes.
418. Id.
419. 589 F.3d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2009), rev’d on other grounds, 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011).
420. Id.
421. Id. at 1203.
422. See id. at 1220. The majority did not mention Gardner’s Presumption, but the
dissent did. Without addressing the issue of whether a statute that sets an appeal deadline is
a veterans’ benefits statute, the dissent chastised the majority for ignoring Gardner’s
Presumption:
This court often pays lip-service to “the canon that provisions for benefits to
members of the Armed Services are to be construed in the beneficiaries’ favor.” . . .
In reality, however, it not infrequently fails in its “fundamental obligation to apply
the law, when the issue is an open one, in favor of the veteran.” Even if this were a
close case, which it is not, we would be obliged to resolve any interpretive doubt
regarding whether equitable tolling applies to section 7266 in the veteran’s favor.
Id. at 1232 (Mayer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
423. See Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1206 (2011) (stating that the VA is
required to give veterans the benefit of any doubt when reviewing evidence regarding the
veteran’s claim).

JELLUM.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

RECONCILING BROWN V. GARDNER’S PRESUMPTION

10/2/2011 5:18 PM

109

C. Gardner’s Presumption When Chevron Applies
Gardner’s application should be curtailed in another way as well.
Gardner’s Presumption, as currently formulated, should not apply when
Chevron applies because Chevron’s second step and Gardner’s
Presumption directly collide. Alternatively, if Gardner’s Presumption
were to re-morph into a liberal construction canon, then it should apply at
Chevron’s first step, as all liberal construction canons do, rather than at
Chevron’s second step. Indeed, regardless of which form it takes,
Gardner’s Presumption is simply inapplicable during Chevron’s second
step. This section addresses the conflict between Chevron and Gardner’s
Presumption.
1.

No application
In its super-strong formulation, Gardner’s Presumption should play no
role in cases involving VA interpretations entitled to Chevron deference for
two reasons. First, this resolution is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence related to both Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron.
Second, Gardner’s Presumption invites courts to let their view of what is
most beneficial to veterans trump the view of the expert agency, the VA.
First, a resolution precluding the Presumption from applying in cases
that involve VA interpretations entitled to Chevron deference is consistent
with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence related to Gardner’s Presumption.
Importantly, neither Boone, Fishgold, nor King involved an agency
interpretation, and therefore, Chevron was not an issue in those cases.424
Moreover, the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the conflict.
While Gardner did involve an agency interpretation, the Court never
reached Chevron’s second step because the statute was clear.425 Rather, the
Court simply noted that the interpreting regulation was inconsistent with
the plain language of the statute—a holding consistent with Chevron’s first
step—and stopped its analysis.426 Admittedly, the Court indirectly
addressed Chevron’s second step in a footnote.427 In that footnote, the
Court indicated that even if the statutory language were ambiguous, a
finding consistent with Chevron’s second step, any “interpretive doubt
[would] be resolved in the veteran’s favor.”428 Yet, the dictum contained in
424. King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S. 215 (1991); Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock &
Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946); Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561 (1943).
425. As noted earlier, the first time the Court cites Chevron is toward the end of the
opinion, when the Court quotes another case, Good Samaritan Hospital v. Shalala, 508 U.S.
402, 409 (1993), which quotes Chevron. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 120 (1994). Only
in the very last paragraph does the Court cite Chevron for justification for the Court’s
refusal to defer. Id. at 122.
426. Id. at 118–19.
427. Id. at 118 n.2.
428. Id.
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this footnote does not show either that the Court clearly understood the
conflict between Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron’s second step or that
the Court actually resolved that conflict. Rather, the footnote appears to be
more of an afterthought, added as additional support for the Court’s
primary reasoning. Simply put, the Supreme Court to date has not directly
addressed the question of whether Gardner’s Presumption should apply in
the face of a reasonable, but contradictory, agency interpretation.
Second, if the Supreme Court were to actually address the issue, it
should conclude that Gardner’s Presumption has no role in cases involving
VA interpretations entitled to Chevron deference. According to Chevron,
agencies have the power to interpret ambiguous statutes because of their
expertise, because of Congress’s implied delegation to them, and because
they are politically accountable.429
Applying Chevron’s delegation
rationale to veterans law, the Court should note that Congress gives power
to the VA to fill the interstices of the law; such power is given neither to
veterans, nor to the courts.430 If Gardner’s Presumption applied to cases in
which Chevron also applied, then Chevron would no longer be about the
reasonableness of the VA’s interpretation. Rather, under the current
version of Gardner’s Presumption, Chevron would become a question of
which interpretation—the VA’s or the veteran’s—that the court thought
was more favorable to the veteran. Because the veteran’s interpretation
will almost always be the most veteran-friendly, the power to fill interstices
in the law would belong to veterans and the courts rather than to the
experienced VA.
Notably, there would be less conflict if Gardner’s Presumption returned
to its original formulation, although the conflict would not disappear
completely. If courts were directed to broadly interpret ambiguous
veterans’ benefits statutes at some point in the Chevron analysis, the
veteran’s interpretive role would lessen but not disappear. In this scenario,
the courts’ role would be greater than currently envisioned under Chevron,
for courts would have to determine which of two interpretations—the VA’s
or the veteran’s—was the better interpretation. While this result is an
improvement because the balance of interpretive power would not be in
each veteran-litigant’s hands, it is not ideal because the court would retain
the balance of interpretive power. If Gardner’s Presumption plays a role
when Chevron applies, it seems unlikely that a court would adopt the VA’s
reasonable interpretation.
Perhaps for this reason, the Federal Circuit cautioned that courts “must
take care not to invalidate otherwise reasonable agency regulations simply
429. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44, 865–
66 (1984).
430. Id. at 865.
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because they do not provide for a pro-claimant outcome in every
imaginable case.”431 In Sears, the Federal Circuit soundly rejected a
veteran’s argument that “ambiguity must always be resolved in favor of the
veteran because the pro-claimant policy underlying the veterans’ benefits
scheme overrides Chevron deference.”432 Similarly, in Terry, the Federal
Circuit recognized Gardner’s Presumption as “a canon of statutory
construction,” but noted that it does not affect whether a regulation meets
the requirements of Chevron.433 In other words, courts should ignore
Gardner’s Presumption when Chevron applies.
2.

Chevron’s first step
Alternatively, assuming the statute in controversy is a veterans’ benefits
statute and that Chevron applies, then Gardner’s Presumption as remorphed might be part of Chevron’s first step—determining whether
Congress has directly spoken to the issue—not a trump to Chevron’s
second step. If courts were to apply Gardner’s Presumption as currently
formulated at Chevron’s first step, then courts might let their own view of
what most helps a particular veteran trump the VA’s view, which aims to
benefit veterans as a group. But in its original form, Gardner’s
Presumption was nothing more than a liberal construction canon in the
context of a particular area of law.434 Because veterans’ benefits statutes
are remedial,435 courts applying Chevron’s first step could presume that
Congress intended a liberal construction. Assuming that Congress prefers
courts to interpret veterans’ benefits statutes liberally, then applying this
liberal construction canon during the analysis of Chevron’s first step makes
sense. And assuming that the first step of Chevron requires a full statutory
analysis with all “the traditional tools of statutory construction,”436 then
applying this liberal construction canon during the analysis of Chevron’s
first step is consistent with courts’ use of other remedial canons. Indeed,
the Supreme Court and lower courts have applied remedial canons in this
way in the past.437 Thus, Gardner’s Presumption would no longer be an
431. Sears v. Principi, 349 F.3d 1326, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
432. Id. at 1331. Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit did not explain how to resolve the
tension between Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron’s second step.
433. Terry v. Principi, 340 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing Nat’l Org. of
Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2001)).
434. See supra Part II.A (explaining the development of Gardner’s Presumption as
liberally construed).
435. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
436. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9
(1984). But see, Chevron’s Demise, supra note 95, at 729 n.25 (arguing that Justice Scalia
has successfully transformed Chevron’s first step from a full statutory construction inquiry
into a textual inquire only).
437. See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 n.45 (2001) (applying presumption
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ace in the hole for veterans, but the concepts behind the Presumption and
veterans law in general—which are pro-claimant and veteran-friendly—
would still be furthered. Moreover, agency expertise would be retained.
While no court has directly applied this approach, the Federal Circuit
came the closest in National Organization of Veterans’ Advocates, Inc. v.
Secretary of Veterans Affairs.438 In that case, the court hinted that
Gardner’s Presumption, in its present super-strong formation, should be
part of Chevron’s first step. The court found the statute in that case to be
ambiguous because the legislative history suggested one interpretation
while Gardner’s Presumption suggested another.439 Thus, although one of
the traditional tools of interpretation, legislative history, directly supported
the VA’s interpretation, the Federal Circuit gave less weight to that history
because of Gardner’s Presumption.440
Importantly, Chevron was not an issue in that case because the
interpreting regulation was not issued through notice and comment
procedures.441 Yet, the court noted that if Chevron applied, the next step in
the court’s analysis would be to apply Chevron’s second step because the
traditional tools of statutory interpretation pointed in opposite directions.442
In saying that Chevron would be the next step, the court implied that
Gardner’s Presumption should be part of Chevron’s first step. The court’s
approach is sound except for one point: if a court applies Gardner’s
Presumption in its super-strong formulation at step one, then it is unlikely
that the court would ever reach step two because the court would
overwhelmingly find in favor of the veteran. If instead a court applies
Gardner’s Presumption in its liberal-construction formulation at step one,
then it is very possible that the court would still find a statute ambiguous
despite applying the Presumption.
3.

Chevron’s second step
While Gardner’s Presumption as re-morphed may be relevant to the
inquiry under Chevron’s first step, it is never relevant at Chevron’s second
step. When Chevron’s second step applies, courts should adopt any

against retroactivity during Chevron’s first step); see also Kenneth Bamberger, Normative
Canons in the Review of Administrative Policymaking, 118 YALE L. J. 64, 77–78 (2008)
(suggesting that a majority of courts apply such canons to eliminate statutory ambiguity at
Chevron’s first step).
438. 260 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
439. Id. at 1377–78. The court noted that the canons of interpretation for resolving that
ambiguity pointed in different directions. Specifically, the legislative history was relatively
clear that the VA’s interpretation was correct. Id. at 1377.
440. Id. at 1378 (quoting Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994)).
441. Id. (“While the parties do not argue the point, the Supreme Court has held that
Chevron deference does not normally apply to informal rulemakings.”).
442. Id.
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reasonable VA interpretation. In so doing, courts should presume that the
VA—the expert agency charged with helping veterans—adopted the
interpretation that is most helpful to veterans as a whole even if the
veteran-litigant loses. Courts do not have the requisite expertise to identify
that interpretation; that was one lesson from Chevron.443 If courts apply
Gardner’s Presumption in every case in which they find statutes
ambiguous after applying step one of Chevron, then the veteran-litigant’s
interpretation will always control, unless it is absurd. Thus, each individual
veteran would have the power to hijack the interpretive process from the
VA.
A resolution to adopt any reasonable interpretation of the VA when
applying Chevron’s second step is consistent with the later jurisprudence of
both the Federal Circuit444 and the Veterans Court.445 Both of these courts
ultimately concluded that when a court reaches Chevron’s second step,
Gardner’s Presumption does not apply. For example, in the Federal
Circuit’s most recent case to address this issue, Guerra v. Shinseki,446 the
majority made clear that Chevron’s second step trumped Gardner’s
Presumption.447 In Guerra, the issue on appeal was whether the VA
correctly interpreted a statute that provided for additional monthly
compensation to severely-disabled veterans.448 The statute provided
significant additional compensation to veterans who had a particular
disability rated at 100% (a “total disability”) if that veteran also had
“another independently rated disability or combination of disabilities rated
at 60%, or was permanently housebound by reason of service-connected
disability.”449 The veteran in the case had multiple service-connected
443. In Chevron, the Court noted the importance of agency expertise, reasoning that
“judges are not experts,” at least not in these technical areas. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. In
contrast, agency personnel are highly qualified to make technical determinations and are
charged with making such determinations. Id. Thus, it simply makes sense to defer to such
expertise. Id. This justification was not new. Two earlier cases had also referred to this
rationale. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns., Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130–31 (1944) (commenting
that administrators had the benefit of “[e]veryday experience in the administration of the
statute” which “gives it familiarity with the circumstances and backgrounds of employment
relationships”); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 137–38 (1944) (opining that the
agency administrator had “accumulated a considerable experience in the problems” that the
agency faced).
444. E.g., Sears v. Principi, 349 F.3d 1326, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (cautioning that
courts “must take care not to invalidate otherwise reasonable agency regulations simply
because they do not provide for a pro-claimant outcome in every imaginable case.”); accord
Terry v. Principi, 340 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Nat’l Org. of Veterans’ Advocates,
Inc. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 260 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
445. See generally Haas v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 257, 269 n.4 (2006), rev’d sub nom.
Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
446. 642 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
447. Id. at 1049.
448. Id. at 1047.
449. Id. at 1050. The statute provides that a veteran shall receive special monthly
compensation: “If the veteran has a service-connected disability rated as total, and (1) has
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disabilities that when combined exceeded a rating of 100%, but none of
those disabilities individually rated at 100%.450 The veteran argued that
additional compensation should be available to any veteran who was totally
disabled, regardless of whether the veteran had a single disability rated at
100% or had multiple disability ratings that combined to 100%.451 The
Veterans Court disagreed, and pursuant to Chevron’s first step, found the
text of the statute clear: the veteran did not meet the threshold requirement
for special monthly compensation of “a service-connected disability rated
as total” because none of his disabilities independently rated as 100%.452
A majority of the Federal Circuit agreed, looking to the statute’s use of
the singular “a” before “service-connected disability.”453 However, the
majority acknowledged that the statute “[was] not entirely free from
ambiguity,” so the court felt “compelled” to defer to the VA’s
interpretation pursuant to Chevron’s second step.454 Because the VA had
promulgated a regulation interpreting the statute to require “a single
service-connected disability rated as 100 percent,” the veteran’s
interpretation failed.455 The majority noted that it had previously rejected
“the argument that the pro-veteran canon of construction [Gardner’s
Presumption] overrides the deference due to the VA’s reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous statute.”456 Thus, the majority found the
statute ambiguous and adopted the VA’s reasonable interpretation pursuant
to Chevron; consequently, Gardner’s Presumption was simply
inapplicable.457
In contrast, the dissent found Chevron inapplicable and asserted that the
majority should have turned to Gardner’s Presumption rather than to
Chevron’s second step once it had found ambiguity. Pursuant to this
approach, veterans would always resolve any interpretive doubt or
ambiguity in a veterans’ benefits statute. Yet, the dissent’s approach is
surely wrong. When courts turn to Chevron’s second step to interpret
ambiguous statutes, Gardner’s Presumption should be irrelevant. When
the VA has reasonably interpreted statutes using force of law procedures,
the interpretations are entitled to Chevron deference because the VA has
the power to interpret ambiguous statutes, not veterans.
additional service-connected disability or disabilities independently ratable at 60 percent or
more, or, (2) by reason of such veteran’s service-connected disability or disabilities, is
permanently housebound.” 38 U.S.C. 1114(s) (2006).
450. Guerra, 642 F.3d at 1048.
451. Id. at 1048.
452. Id. (referencing 38 U.S.C. 1114(s) (2006)).
453. Id. at 1049.
454. Id.
455. Id. (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 3.350(i) (2009) (emphasis added)).
456. Id. at 1051 (citing Sears v. Principi, 349 F.3d 1326, 1331–32 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
457. Id. at 1049.
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D. Gardner’s Presumption When Chevron Does Not Apply
If the statute in controversy is a veterans’ benefits statute and if Chevron
does not apply, then Gardner’s Presumption, preferably as re-morphed,
should apply. Gardner’s Presumption applies in those cases in which the
VA either has not acted or has not acted in a way that would entitle it to
Chevron deference. In the context of VA interpretations, Chevron
deference is inapplicable in three situations: (1) when the litigation
involves private parties and there is no relevant VA regulation; (2) when
the VA has not interpreted the statute prior to the litigation; and (3) when
the VA is not entitled to Chevron deference for its interpretation of a
statute.458
First, for those cases involving private litigants, such as an employer and
the veteran, Gardner’s Presumption is a fair tiebreaker, assuming the VA
has not promulgated a regulation or acted via formal adjudication to
interpret the statute. The purpose of veterans’ statutes in general is to thank
veterans for their service and help them assimilate back into society;459
hence, interpreting a veterans’ statute to benefit veterans rather than
employers, other private litigants, or governments, makes sense as a
statutory interpretation approach. Such an approach is also consistent with
the remedial construction canon. For example, if Congress had to choose
between inconveniencing employers by requiring them to keep the jobs of
service personnel available or inconveniencing veterans who had to leave a
job to fight a war, Congress likely would choose to protect veterans’ job
security. These are, perhaps, the easy cases.
Second, however, when the litigation is not between the veteran and a
private or government party, but rather between the veteran and the VA;
then, the answer is less simple. When the VA has not interpreted a statute
prior to the litigation, then Gardner’s Presumption may be a fair tiebreaker.
For example, in Robinette v. Brown,460 the Veterans Court reviewed a VA
decision denying a veteran entitlement to service-connected benefits for
diabetes.461 The veteran’s service records had been destroyed in a fire.462
To establish that his military service caused his diabetes, the veteran
offered his written recollection of what his physician had told him.463 The
issue for the court was whether the VA was obligated to advise the veteran
as to what evidence was necessary for his application to be complete.464
The relevant statute provided that “[i]f a claimant’s application for benefits
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.

See discussion supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.B.
8 Vet. App. 69 (1995).
Id. at 71.
Id.
Id. at 71, 73.
Id. at 77.
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under the laws administered by the Secretary is incomplete, the Secretary
shall notify the claimant of the evidence necessary to complete the
application.”465 The VA argued that it need only help veterans complete
the claim form, not help them identify necessary evidence.466 The court
rejected this argument as contrary to the plain meaning of the text.467 In so
doing, the court referred to Gardner’s Presumption and rejected the VA’s
“quite narrow” interpretation.468 In this case, the VA had not, prior to the
litigation, interpreted the statute in a way that deserved Chevron
deference.469 Rather, the VA had interpreted the statute during the
litigation or during the events leading up to the litigation.470 In this
situation, the court’s decision to turn to Gardner’s Presumption makes
sense because there was no carefully considered agency interpretation
entitled to deference. Rather, the VA offered its position for the first time
in response to litigation without using force of law procedures. The
deliberateness and carefulness of the VA’s interpretation might be suspect
if developed informally in response to pending litigation; hence, it should
not receive strong deference.
Third, even when the VA interprets a statute prior to the ensuing
litigation but does so without using force of law procedures, then
Gardner’s Presumption may be a fair tiebreaker.471 Agencies interpret
statutes regularly and in varied ways, with more or less procedural
formality and deliberation. For example, an agency might interpret a
statute as part of a notice and comment rulemaking process, like the
Environmental Protection Agency did in Chevron.472 Similarly, an agency
might interpret a statute during a formal adjudication. In contrast, an
agency might interpret a statute when drafting an internal policy manual or
when writing a letter to a regulated entity.473 With the first two processes,
Congress gave the agency the authority to issue interpretations that carry
“force of law,” and the agency used that authority to issue the particular
465. Id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. 5103(a) (1994) (emphasis added)).
466. Id.
467. Id. at 78.
468. Id. at 77.
469. Id.
470. See id. at 78–79 (describing the Secretary’s interpretation of the statute in the
context of litigation).
471. For a detailed discussion of when Skidmore deference is appropriate and when
Chevron deference is appropriate, see Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV.
187, 207 (2006) (exploring the disagreement between Justices Scalia and Breyer regarding
Chevron’s first step); Lisa Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1486 (2005) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
in this area); Jellum supra note 281, at 86–98.
472. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 840 (1984).
473. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (interpreting a statute in
a bulletin); Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (interpreting a statute in
response to a letter inquiry from the county).
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interpretation.474 For this reason, these processes are considered more
formal, or procedurally prescribed, while the latter processes are less
formal, or less procedurally prescribed.475 According to three Supreme
Court cases decided a decade ago, Chevron deference is appropriate (1)
when Congress delegates relatively formal procedures that the agency uses,
or (2) when Congress provides other evidence that it intended courts to
defer to the agency interpretation.476 In all other situations, a different level
of deference applies: Skidmore deference.477 According to Skidmore
deference, courts should consider whether the agency’s interpretation was
persuasive, taking into account “all those factors which give [the agency
interpretation] power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”478 This
“power-to-persuade” test involves a balancing of three factors: (1) the
consistency of the agency’s interpretation; (2) the thoroughness of the
agency’s consideration; and, (3) the soundness of the agency’s reasoning.479
A court could consider Gardner’s Presumption as one part of its analysis
regarding whether the VA’s reasoning was persuasive under Skidmore
analysis.
The Veterans Court adopted a similar, although less clearly stated,
approach in Osman v. Peake.480 In that case, the court noted that Skidmore
deference was the appropriate standard for reviewing a VA General
Counsel opinion that interpreted a statute.481 The issue in Osman was
whether the son of two permanently-disabled veterans was entitled to one
dependent educational benefit or whether he was entitled to two separate
awards based on each parent’s disability.482 The text of the relevant statute
provided that “[e]ach eligible person shall . . . be entitled to receive
educational assistance.”483 “Person” in the statute was defined as a “child
of a person who, as a result of qualifying service . . . has a total disability
permanent in nature resulting from a service-connected disability.”484 The
VA General Counsel had, prior to the case, issued a “precedent opinion”
474. Mead, 533 U.S. at 231–33.
475. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 471, at 1447 (questioning “whether Chevron
deference applies to interpretations issued through informal procedures”).
476. As some have noted:
[After] Christensen, Mead, and Barnhart, the real question is Congress’s (implied)
instructions in the particular statutory scheme. The grant of authority to act with
the force of law is a sufficient but not necessary condition for a court to find that
Congress has granted an agency the power to interpret ambiguous statutory terms.
Sunstein, supra note 471, at 218.
477. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
478. Id. at 140.
479. Id.
480. 22 Vet. App. 252 (2008).
481. Id. at 256.
482. Id. at 253.
483. Id. at 255 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 3510 (2006)).
484. Id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 3501 (a)(1)(A)(i-ii) (2006)).
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interpreting the statute to prohibit dual awards.485 VA General Counsel
precedential opinions are binding on the VA; hence, the VA denied the
son’s request for benefits based on his mother’s disability because the son
had already received benefits based on his father’s disability.486
The Veterans Court reversed the VA’s denial.487 Applying Skidmore, the
court noted that it would defer to the VA interpretation to the extent the
interpretation was persuasive because “such opinions do constitute a body
of experience and informed judgment.”488 After reviewing the statutory
language and rejecting the VA’s interpretation, the court cited Gardner’s
Presumption in noting that “[e]ven if the question . . . were a close one, the
Court is bound to find [for the veteran’s son].”489 After finding the VA
interpretation unpersuasive and inconsistent with the statutory language,
the court rejected the VA’s interpretation entirely.490
Similarly, in Sharp v. Shinseki491 the Veterans Court turned to Gardner’s
Presumption after first finding that Skidmore, rather than Chevron,
applied.492 After exhaustively and unsuccessfully reviewing the text and
legislative history of the statutes at issue,493 the court did not find the VA’s
485. Id. at 256 (quoting Gen. Coun. Prec. 1-2002, at 1).
486. Id. at 256–57 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 7104(c) (2006)).
487. Id. at 261.
488. Id. at 256.
489. Id. at 259 (citations omitted).
490. Id. at 256–60; accord Hornick v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 50, 53 (2010) (applying
Skidmore deference to review the VA’s interpretation contained in a general counsel
precedent opinion).
491. 23 Vet. App. 267 (2009).
492. Id. at 275. The facts of the case are complicated, but can be found in Jellum,
Chevron’s Step Zero?, supra note 189. Importantly, although the VA had promulgated two
regulations that both related to the issue, Chevron did not apply because in Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006), the Supreme Court held that when regulations merely parrot
statutory language, Chevron is inappropriate. Sharp v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 267, 275
(2009). Here, the Veterans Court found that the implementing regulations parroted the
underlying statutory language. Id. at 274–75. Thus, Skidmore rather than Chevron, applied.
Id. at 275.
493. The court noted that the text of that section was silent regarding how the effective
date for such additional compensation should be determined. 23 Vet. App. at 272. In the
face of this silence, the court turned to the legislative history of this statute. According to
the court, the legislative history suggested that the purpose of the statute was to “defray the
costs of supporting the veteran’s . . . dependents when a service-connected disability is of a
certain level hindering the veteran’s employment abilities.” Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 951054, at 19 (1978)). While this purpose might favor a broad interpretation of § 1115
generally, the legislative history did not specifically identify the effective date that should
apply to additional compensation claims under § 1115:
The limited legislative history enlightens the Court as to the purpose of providing
additional compensation for dependents, but such history does not assist the Court
in determining whether Congress intended additional compensation for dependents
under section 1115 to be on (1) only the first rating decision meeting statutory
criteria of section 1115 or (2) any rating decision meeting the statutory criteria.
Id.
Finding the legislative history unenlightening, the court returned to the text and concluded
that entitlement to § 1115 benefits should accrue whenever the statutory factors were met.
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interpretation persuasive because “the Secretary ha[d] offered no support
for his position.”494 To resolve the ambiguity, the court turned to
Gardner’s Presumption and stated that Gardner required an “expansive
reading of the statute.”495 Finding the veteran’s interpretation to be more
favorable to veterans, the court reversed the VA’s determination.496
In the same way, the Federal Circuit has applied Gardner’s Presumption
when Chevron did not apply. In Sursely, the court reversed a Veterans
Court’s opinion affirming the VA’s decision to refuse a veteran’s request
for two separate clothing allowances.497 The facts of the case were stated
earlier:498 the Veterans Court affirmed the VA’s denial of the second claim
based on the fact that the relevant statute was clear because it used the
singular, reading “shall pay a clothing allowance.”499 The Federal Circuit
reversed.500 Because the Veteran Court’s contrary interpretation suggested
ambiguity, the Federal Circuit reviewed the enactment history501 and
mentioned Gardner’s Presumption.502 Specifically, the court noted that in
the face of statutory ambiguity, it had to apply Gardner’s Presumption.503
Importantly, the court noted in a footnote that because Chevron was
inapplicable, the court could consider Gardner’s Presumption.504
Thus, while Gardner’s Presumption should have limited or no
application when the VA has interpreted a statute in a manner entitling that
interpretation to Chevron deference, Gardner’s Presumption is appropriate
when Chevron does not apply.
Even if courts apply Gardner’s
Presumption to this narrow group of cases, however, courts should apply
the Presumption to veterans’ benefits statutes only and not to generally
applicable statutes. Moreover, courts should return Gardner’s Presumption
Id. In other words, although the statute did not explicitly so provide, the court concluded
that whenever a veteran met § 1115’s criteria, the veteran’s dependents were impliedly
entitled to additional compensation. Id.
494. Id. at 275.
495. Id. at 275–76 (citing Sursely v. Peake, 551 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009)).
496. Id. at 277.
497. 551 F.3d at 1353.
498. See supra notes 274–286.
499. See Sursely v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 21, 22, 25–26 (2007) (referring to 38 U.S.C.
§1162 (2003) (emphasis added)), rev’d, 551 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
500. Sursely, 551 F.3d at 1353.
501. As to the enactment history, originally, the statute had permitted clothing
allowances for individuals using “a prosthetic or orthopedic appliance or appliances.” Id. at
1356 (quoting Veterans’ Compensation and Relief Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-328, § 103,
86 Stat. 393, 394 (1972)). In 1989, Congress amended the statute to delete the word
“appliances” and to insert the singular: “appliance.” Id. at 1357. According to the court,
this extrinsic evidence—the amendment—showed that Congress intended “to provide
additional benefits for those veterans . . . who use multiple orthopedic appliances.” Id.
502. Id. at 1355.
503. Id. at 1357.
504. Id. at 1357 n.5 (“[W]e need not consider the applicability of Sears v. Principi, . . .
which properly urges caution when considering the meaning of a statute in light of both
Brown and Chevron.”).
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to its childhood formulation: it was only ever meant to encourage courts
and the VA to interpret veterans’ benefits statutes liberally to thank
veterans for their sacrifice and help them return to society smoothly.
Gardner’s Presumption has since morphed well beyond its humble
beginnings.
E. Gardner’s Presumption Belongs to the VA, Not to the Court
A final alternative, and perhaps the best way to resolve the tension
between Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron would be to view the
direction that “interpretive doubt is to be resolved in the veteran’s favor”505
as a duty belonging to the VA and not as an interpretive tool belonging to
the courts. Admittedly, this resolution is contrary to the Presumption as
currently formulated. Yet, this resolution would work. The VA would
have to provide adequate written reasons for its findings and conclusions of
law and fact so that the veteran claimant can understand the basis for the
VA’s decision and so that the Veterans Court can review that decision.506
In these findings, the VA could be required to include information
regarding whether it considered Gardner’s Presumption during its
decision-making process. The courts could then evaluate whether the VA
met its duty when the courts apply either the second step of Chevron or
Skidmore. In other words, one test of the reasonableness or persuasiveness
of the VA’s interpretation would be whether the VA took Gardner’s
Presumption into account.
This approach would place the duty of finding a reasonable
interpretation that most favors veterans as a whole on the shoulders of the
agency charged with helping veterans. Given that the veteran-claimant will
always be seeking benefits that the VA has denied, this duty would, at least
where both the VA and veteran have proffered “reasonable” interpretations,
require the VA to explain why its preferred interpretation better serves
veterans as a group (for example, because of the number of individuals
affected) as opposed to the veteran’s interpretation. As such, the approach
melds the best of the current approach—namely favoring veterans—with
the best of the alternatives—including the VA’s expertise in the
interpretation process.
The Veterans Court actually suggested this approach in Cottle v.
Principi.507 In that case, the VA General Counsel acknowledged that a
statute could be read broadly to cover the veteran’s injury but admitted
505. Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994).
506. See Allday v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 517, 527 (1995) (explaining the information that
the Board of Veterans’ Appeals must provide to enable a claimant to understand its decision
and for a court to review the decision).
507. 14 Vet. App. 329 (2001).
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choosing to interpret the statute narrowly in her Precedent Opinion.508 The
court rejected her interpretation and chastised her for “fail[ing] to discuss
or consider Gardner at all.”509 The court stressed that Gardner’s
Presumption required the VA to “resolv[e] any interpretative doubt in favor
of the veteran.”510 While not exactly correct, the court’s suggestion
supports the feasibility of this approach.
The Veterans Court has toyed with this approach in other cases as well.
For example, in Smith v. Nicholson,511 the court chided the VA for failing
to consider Gardner’s Presumption.512 Similarly, Judge Kasold’s dissent in
Ross v. Peake513 chastised the VA for failing to consider and discuss
Gardner’s Presumption.514 Finally, in Jones v. Principi,515 the Veterans
Court remanded the case, specifically directing the VA to evaluate the role
that Gardner’s Presumption should play in the VA’s decision.516
While placing the duty on the VA rather than leaving the Presumption to
the courts to interpret statutes in favor of veterans might alleviate some of
the conflict, it may not eliminate the conflict completely. If courts at
Chevron’s second step consider whether the VA considered Gardner’s
Presumption when it interpreted a statute, then it is unclear whether an
interpretation that does not favor a particular veteran-litigant would be
veteran-friendly enough to be considered reasonable. Thus, placing the
burden on the VA may not completely eliminate the conflict between
Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron, but it would be an improvement over
the conflict in place today.
CONCLUSION
Gardner’s Presumption morphed from a simple directive to courts to
construe veterans’ benefits statutes liberally into a veterans’ trump card in
which the VA always loses the interpretive battle. Today, Gardner’s
Presumption is a canon of interpretation that directs courts to resolve
interpretive doubt in a veteran’s favor. Yet, Gardner’s Presumption
directly conflicts with Chevron, which directs courts to adopt an agency’s
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. The Veterans Court and
Federal Circuit have struggled unsuccessfully to resolve this conflict, while
the Supreme Court has never directly addressed it. Yet the two doctrines
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
banc).
514.
515.
516.

Id. at 336.
Id.
Id.
19 Vet. App. 63 (2005), rev’d in part, 451 F.3d 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See id. at 73.
21 Vet. App. 534, 536–37 (2008) (Kasold, J., dissenting) (denial of rehearing en
See id. at 536.
16 Vet. App. 219 (2002).
Id. at 226–27.
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simply cannot coexist harmoniously as currently formulated. Either the
VA has the power to interpret ambiguous statutes pursuant to Chevron’s
second step, or veterans have the power to interpret ambiguous statutes
pursuant to Gardner’s Presumption. If guidance from the Supreme Court
is not forthcoming soon, the lower courts will have to resolve this issue
themselves.517
This article explores the conflict and offers three ways for the lower
courts to resolve the tension. First, regardless of which resolution is
ultimately selected, Gardner’s Presumption should return to its humble
beginnings. Gardner’s Presumption began as a liberal construction canon,
similar to the remedial statutes interpretive canon. Rather than require
courts to interpret all ambiguous statutes to favor veteran-litigants, the
precursor to Gardner’s Presumption merely directed courts to construe
ambiguous veterans’ statutes liberally. Simply returning Gardner’s
Presumption to its humble beginnings would eliminate most of the conflict
between Gardner’s Presumption and Chevron.
Second, the courts should apply Gardner’s Presumption in very limited
situations. Specifically, courts should apply Gardner’s Presumption only
when the statute at issue addresses veterans’ benefits, or at least veterans,
and only when the VA has not already interpreted the statute in a way that
entitles the VA to Chevron deference. Possibly, Gardner’s Presumption, as
re-morphed, might play a role in Chevron’s first step; however, it should
have absolutely no role in Chevron’s second step.
Third, and alternatively, Gardner’s Presumption could be viewed as a
duty belonging to the VA rather than as an interpretive canon to be applied
by the courts. With this approach, whether the VA considered Gardner’s
Presumption, whatever its formulation, in interpreting a statute would be
just one factor for a court to consider when applying either Chevron’s
second step or Skidmore deference. This resolution is appropriate because
it returns interpretive power to the VA while constraining the VA’s
interpretive choices. If the VA were unable to explain why a particular
interpretation would be most beneficial to veterans as a whole, then the
VA’s interpretation would be neither reasonable under Chevron, nor
persuasive under Skidmore. While this resolution makes the most sense, it
is admittedly not in concert with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this
area. Thus, the Veterans Court and Federal Circuit may feel compelled not
to adopt this appealing approach.
In sum, there is no perfect resolution to this conflict, but there are a few
workable alternatives. The time has come for the lower courts to resolve

517. See DeBeaord v. Principi, 18 Vet. App. 357, 368 (2004) (noting that guidance from
the Supreme Court is necessary to resolve the issue).
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this conflict by offering concrete and consistent direction for those
litigating veterans’ cases, as the Supreme Court appears unlikely to offer
guidance anytime soon.

